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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Yunus' daughter performed one of her favorite operatic pieces,
Mozart's Alleluia, just weeks earlier, and now he heard it again during
his own moment on the stage.2 As soon as the joyful motet ended, he
would be giving the most important speech of his life to an audience that
extended beyond the dignitaries in the room. "I call upon Muhammad
Yunus," said the chairman of the nominating committee.' The Ban-
gladeshi economics professor who developed the concepts of
microcredit and microfinance stood up, bowed to the audience, and
stepped behind the podium to deliver his Nobel Peace Prize lecture.'
In his speech, Dr. Yunus referred to entrepreneurs motivated more
by social good than profit and called for laws to recognize a new social
business form:
Social business will be a new kind of business introduced in the
marketplace with the objective of making a difference in the
world....
Once social business is recognized in law, many existing compa-
nies will come forward to create social businesses in addition to their
foundation activities. Many activists from the non-profit sector will
also find this an attractive option. Unlike the non-profit sector where
one needs to collect donations to keep activities going, a social busi-
2. Arkansas Times Staff, Soprano Sings Her Favorites: Monica Yunus Performs at UALR,
ARK. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.arktimes.comlarkansas/soprano-sings-her-favorites/
Content?oid=865691.
3. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 10, 2006), http:l
nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=104&view=1.
4. Id. See Muhammad Yunus - Biography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel
prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
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ness will be self-sustaining and create surplus for expansion since it
is a non-loss enterprise. Social business will go into a new type of
capital market of its own, to raise capital.'
Although nothing is new about insisting that charities be frugal or finan-
cially self-sufficient, 6 the view that such charities should avail them-
selves of or commit themselves to earning income is a concept that
challenges our orthodox notions of altruistic organizations. Not until
recent decades was the term "social entrepreneur"' even part of our col-
lective vocabulary, where "charity in our culture became overwhelm-
ingly and, it seems irrevocably, associated with enterprise."8
The issue of whether social entrepreneurship in the United States
needed new tax laws and legal forms was addressed at a 2006 Aspen
Institute meeting, which drew over forty leading thinkers in the social
enterprise movement.9 One of the ideas that garnered attention was the
idea of a low-profit limited liability company, or L3C.10 A state that
amended its LLC statutes to allow for an L3C would have an available
new legal form, which prioritized charitable purpose like nonprofits but
which allowed for taxable income distribution and more flexible capital
structure like for-profit entities." In April 2008, Vermont became the
first state to adopt L3C legislation, and, as of August 31, 2011, nine
5. Muhammad Yunus, The Nobel Peace Prize 2006 Nobel Lecture, 13 LAW & Bus. REV.
AMs. 267, 272 (2007).
6. See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America's
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2437-39 n.2 (2005). Professor Kelley
contemplates charity's "double bind" of a "free-market American culture," which expects
charities to embrace efficiency and financial accountability, and a legal and tax environment,
which discourages charities from commercial and marketplace activities. Kelley also observes that
the nomenclature of the word "charity" is "variable and confusing" and, in its broadest sense,
means "giving help to those in need." Id. at 2437 n.2. We adopt this broad definition of charity in
this article, unless otherwise indicated. Thus, when we use the phrase "charitable purpose," we
often mean charitable, educational, social, and exempt purpose.
7. The term "social entrepreneur" was coined or at least popularized in the 1980s by Bill
Drayton. In a recent interview, Drayton noted, "Think back 25 years ago, there was no phrase
[']social entrepreneur[']-we made it up." Ashoka's "Changemaker" Bill Drayton Awarded
Annual 2007 Leadership in Social Entrepreneurship Award, CmR. ADVANCEMENT SOC.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.caseatduke.org/events/leadershipaward/07winner
/index.html.
8. Kelley, supra note 6, at 2462.
9. THOMAS I. BILLITTERI, THE ASPEN INST., MIXING MISSION AND BUSINEsS: DOES SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 2, 10 (2007), available at http://www.community-
wealth.org/_pdfs/news/recent-articles/04-07/report-billiterri.pdf. The daylong meeting, titled
"Exploring New Legal Forms and Tax Structures for Social Enterprise Organizations," was
sponsored by the Aspen Institute's Nonprofit Sector and Philanthropy Program. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 13. Throughout this article, as well as throughout material discussing low-profit
limited liability companies, the abbreviations "L3C" and "L'C" appear interchangeably. In such
instances within this work, both abbreviations refer to low-profit limited liability companies.
11. Id. at 13.
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states and two Indian tribes have adopted L3C statutes.12 Seventeen
additional states are considering or have considered similar L3C bills.13
As of August 29, 2011, 440 L3Cs were registered. 14
An L3C may be formed as a new entity or by converting from an
existing entity." After properly forming under the L3C statute of a par-
ticular state, the L3C can do business in any other U.S. jurisdiction,
assuming all necessary filings.1 6 Several legal scholars have given
credence to the notion that the L3C may be a promising innovation for
social entrepreneurs, 17 whereas critics of the L3C contend that the legal
12. The following states, in order of passage, have adopted L3C legislation: Vermont,
Michigan, Wyoming, Utah, Illinois, Maine, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. See Act
of Apr. 30, 2008, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91; Act of Jan. 15, 2009, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 2583;
Act of Feb. 26, 2009, ch. 55, 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws 130; Low-Profit Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 141, 2009 Utah Laws 522; Act of Aug. 4, 2009, 2009 Ill. Laws 2583; An Act to Replace
the Maine Limited Liability Act, ch. 629, 2010 Me. Laws HP 1118 (LD 1580), available at http://
www.mainelegislature.org/ros/LOMILOM124th/124R2/pdflPUBLIC629.pdf; Limited Liability
Companies, 2010 La. Acts, Act No. 417 (H.B. 1421), available at http://www.legis.state.1a.us/bill
datalstreamdocument.asp?did=721792; Act of Apr. 3, 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 187, available
at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2009/Bills/Senate/PDF/S308v5.pdf; Act of June 20, 2011,
ch. 79, 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws H 5279, available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/lawl l/
lawl 1079.htm. Additionally, the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Crow Indian Nation of Montana have
adopted L3C legislation. See Keren Raz, L3C-An Update by Keren Raz, CHARITY LAW. BLOG
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://charitylawyerblog.com/2010/1 l/3013c---an-update-by-keren-raz.
13. As of May 26, 2011, seventeen other states are considering or have considered L3C
legislation, including Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Rhode Island. A table of new L3C legislative activity can be found at Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State
Series: L3C & B Corporation Legislation Table (Suffolk Univ. Law. Sch., Research Paper No. 10-
11, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=156783.
14. Here's the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.
intersectorl3c.com/13cjtally.htm.
15. Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: An Unlikely
Marriage of For-Profit Entities and Private Foundations, 34 TAX MGMT. EST. Gwrs & TRUSTS J.
209, 209-10 (2009).
16. Id. Since L3Cs are a subset of LLCs, L3Cs will come within the foreign registration or
qualification provisions of the LLC statutes of each state. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 801(a) (2006) ("(a) The law of the state or other jurisdiction under which a foreign limited
liability company is formed governs: (1) the internal affairs of the company; and (2) the liability
of a member as member and a manager as manager for the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of
the company.").
17. See Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the 'L3C' for Program-Related
Investments, TAX'N EXEMPTS, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 11, 18 ("The arrival of the L3C potentially is a
watershed moment for individuals and organizations that are dedicated to achieving social
change."); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 337, 377 (2010) ("[T~he low profit limited liability company, or L3C, proposed by Robert
Lang and his collaborators appears to be the tool best adapted to give legal standing and structure
to its hybrid social enterprises."); Marc J. Lane, The Lane Report September 2008: L3Cs Hold Key
to Solving State's Social Woes, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.marcjlane.com/
index.php?cid=106258&src=news&submenu=MediaLaneReport&srctype=detail&category=20
08%2OLane%20Reports&refno=288&curlid=35; Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, Adding Another
Trick to Your Bag of Tricks, LAW FOR CHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/lfc/NewsBot.asp?
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form is unnecessary or misleading.'I The American Bar Association has
had a mixed response to L3Cs,' 9 and the IRS so far has not yet fully
articulated an exhaustive commentary on the form.20
The goals for this article include providing an objective evaluation
of the characteristics and risks of the L3C entity in order to determine
whether L3Cs are viable legal forms for social enterprises; reconciling
the for-profit and nonprofit duties of loyalty and care in order to ascer-
tain a governance-and-enforcement framework for L3C fiduciaries; rec-
ommending the use of emerging forms of financing (such as online
crowd-funding) in order to align investor expectations and overcome
practical capital-raising problems associated with charitable primacy and
securities law; and, finally, recommending the locking of capital pro-
vided by social investors into the "social stream."21
Part I considers the growing social enterprise movement, the limita-
tions of existing legal forms in accommodating social enterprise, and the
potential benefits of new legal entities to carry out simultaneous for-
profit and nonprofit missions. It also examines how the L3C legal form
is structurally designed to overcome existing legal deficiencies and work
within the existing business and legal landscape. Moreover, Part I
addresses the concerns of the most strident faultfinders of the L3C and
the policy implications of the continued adoption of L3C legislation.
MODE=VIEW&ID=3922&SnID=2 (last visited Aug. 18, 2011) ("[Tjhe L3C and the Benefit
Corporation are both great tools and not direct competitors because they have different benefits
and drawbacks. So when looking to add social enterprise to your bag of tricks, both the L3C and
the Benefit Corporation should be on your agenda."); Marcus Owens & John Tyler, The L
3 C: A
Potentially Useful Tool for Promoting Charitable Purposes, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Nov. 1,
2009), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub -display.cfm?id=4491.
18. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The "Emperor's New Clothes" on the
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 881 (2010); see also Carter G.
Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63
ARK. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2010); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation
Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010); David S. Chernoff,
L3Cs: Less There than Meets the Eye, TAX'N EXEMPTS, May-June 2010, at 3; David Edward
Spenard, Panacea or Problem: A State Regulator's Perspective on the L3C Model, 65 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 131 (2010).
19. See ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on Proposed Additional Examples on Program-
Related Investments, ABA, 7 (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2010/CommentsConcerningProposedAdditional-Exampleson-
ProgramRelatedInvestments.authcheckdam.pdf. But see J. William Callison, Nonbinding
Opinion: L3Cs: Useless Gadgets?, Bus. LAW TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 55.
20. Drea Knufken, Interview: Social Entrepreneurs and the L3C, Bus. PUNDIT (Jan. 13,
2011), http://www.businesspundit.com/interview-social-entrepreneurs-and-the-13c ("President
Obama recently mentioned L3Cs in a press conference about new company opportunities, so
L3Cs are now on the screen of the White House. The IRS also mentions L3C designation under
LLC tax filing now, so it is gaining ground nationally.").
21. In this article "social stream" or "stream of social commerce" refers to the capital floating
in the third (charitable) and fourth (social enterprise) economic sectors.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Part II compares and contrasts the seemingly conflicting fiduciary
duties in the for-profit and not-for-profit areas, before moving on to pro-
pose a blended fiduciary framework for hybrid business forms, such as
L3Cs. Part II submits that a company can have multiple purposes, but
can have only one primary master. While deviations from the path
should be allowed under the business judgment rule, we submit that
managers of L3Cs should focus primarily on the organization's "charita-
ble purpose." Similar to the rights of members of profit-focused LLCs,
we believe that members of L3Cs should have standing to sue for a
breach of fiduciary duty by the entities' managers.
Part III examines the capital-raising and profit-payout puzzles faced
by L3Cs and largely unaddressed by early commentators on the L3C
form. Part III suggests that traditional, profit-focused investors will be
unlikely to invest in an entity, like an L3C, that prioritizes purpose over
profit. To fill the gap left by the absence of most traditional investors,
we suggest that L3Cs utilize crowd-funding in their capital-raising,
which has a number of benefits for L3Cs. Lastly, Part III proposes that
capital committed by social investors to L3Cs (and profit stemming
from that capital) should be locked into the "social stream," and not
simply used to prop up the returns of traditional, profit-focused
investors.
The article concludes that while traditional profit-focused investors
may not be well suited for investment in L3Cs, the L3C form is still
viable. L3Cs may pair foundation funds with money raised from social
investors (including those located through online crowd-funding) who
seriously value the charitable focus of the L3C. Our hope is that this
article, which attempts to consider all published academic analyses of
L3Cs to date,2 2 will serve as an informative guide for social entrepre-
neurs, a reference document for academics committed to a dialogue on
social entrepreneurial forms, a fair assessment of the benefits and risks
of L3Cs for legislators interested in adopting social enterprise legisla-
tion, and a source of ideas for improving the L3C form.
I. SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURISM, HYBRID FORMS, AND THE L3C
A. The Fourth Sector of Social Entrepreneurship
The United States has been described as having three economic
sectors for government, business, and nonprofit activities.2 3 Recently,
the term "fourth sector" has been used to describe the various expres-
22. This article was written primarily from September 2010 to June 2011, with a review of all
L3C literature in law reviews and business journals through May 2011.
23. Amitai Etzioni, The Third Sector and Domestic Missions, 33 PUB. ADMIN. REv., 314, 315
(1973) (recognizing the first sector as government, second sector as business, and also coining the
6 [Vol. 66:1
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sions of social entrepreneurship, including socially responsible busi-
nesses, charitable joint ventures, municipal enterprises, cross-sector
partnerships, and mission-related investing. 24 These fourth-sector orga-
nizations share a dedication to pursuing simultaneous economic, social,
and often environmental benefits, sometimes referred to as "triple bot-
tom line." 25 Such fourth-sector entities are usually organized as corpora-
tions, partnerships, or limited liability companies. Prior to formulation,
however, a thorough legal analysis and complex contractual agreements
are frequently required to promote fulfillment of mission and avoid dras-
tic tax penalties. 26 Even with the help of the most experienced attorneys
skilled in structuring such arrangements, the lack of a convenient legal
form, designed to accommodate the dual goals of profit and charity,
remains the "single greatest challenge" of social enterprises.2 7
Social entrepreneurs have been described as "society's change
agents," creating "innovative solutions to society's most pressing social
problems."2 8 Whereas many business entrepreneurs see cash flow as "a
term "third sector" as encompassing "neither governmental nor private" forms, including quasi-
governmental entities, voluntary associations, and nonprofit corporations).
24. HEERAD SABETI, FOURTH SECTOR NETWORK CONCEPT WORKING GRP., THE EMERGING
FOURTH SECTOR: A NEW SECTOR OF ORGANIZATIONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE PUBLIC,
PRIVATE, AND SOCIAL SECTORs 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/
39/original/The -EmergingFourthSector - Exec_- Summary.pdf?1253667714.
25. The term "triple bottom line" was coined in 1998 by John Elkington and describes an
organization's pursuit of "people, planet, and profit." JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS:
THE TRIPLE BorroM LINE OF 2 1ST CENTURY BUSINESS 69 (1998). See also PETER FISK, PEOPLE,
PLANET, PROFrr: HOW To EMBRACE SUSTAINABILITY FOR INNOVATION AND BUSINESS GROWTH
156 (2010) ("People, planet and profit, often known as the 'triple bottom line' . . . .").
26. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, A "How-To" for Joint Ventures, NAT'L CTR. ON NONPROFIT
ENTER., http://www.nationalcne.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=feature.display&featureid=72 (last
visited July 24, 2011).
27. Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer's Perspective, PERLMAN & PERLMAN
LLP, http://www.perlmanandperlman.com/publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf (last
visited Aug. 8, 2011) (citing Social Enterprise Alliance poll where "71% of respondents reported
that finding the best legal structure for their ventures was the single greatest challenge they faced,"
and for which the pool of respondents included people starting new ventures, and investors
seeking both a social and financial return on investment).
28. About, SKOLL FOUND., http://www.skollfoundation.org/about (last visited Oct. 25, 2010);
What is a Social Entrepreneur?, ASHOKA, http://www.ashoka.org/social-entrepreneur (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010). Precisely defining "social entrepreneur" and distinguishing it from other social
activities, such as social service provision or social activism, is a critical aspect of its study and
development. Roger L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition,
STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2007, at 29, 30. Social entrepreneurship may be defined as
having three components: "(1) identifying a stable but inherently unjust equilibrium that causes
the exclusion, marginalization, or suffering of a segment of humanity that lacks the financial
means or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its own; (2) identifying an
opportunity in this unjust equilibrium, developing a social value proposition, and bringing to bear
inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage, and fortitude, thereby challenging the stable state's
hegemony; and (3) forging a new, stable equilibrium that releases trapped potential or alleviates
the suffering of the targeted group, and through imitation and the creation of a stable ecosystem
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way of measuring value creation," wealth is often "just a means to an
end for social entrepreneurs."29 In embracing market-oriented solutions
to societal ills, social entrepreneurs "often structure their organizations
with earned-income strategies" to minimize reliance on charitable dona-
tions.30 These entrepreneurs claim that outmoded U.S. law based on a
three-sector world and "inappropriate old-style legal entities hamstring
their socially transformative plans" because legitimate vehicles for
social change, which are "cobble[d] together" from existing legal struc-
tures, are "expensive to create, burdensome to maintain, and, due to their
novelty, legally insecure."3
B. Limitations of Existing Legal Forms
In fulfilling their social and business ambitions in the current legal
environment, social entrepreneurs may utilize various entities available
in each of the three traditional economic sectors. In the first sector of
government, socially minded entrepreneurs employed by a federal, state,
or local agency might mobilize the public-benefit machinery of a gov-
ernment institution to further their social interests. Examples of such
machinery include providing social-innovation funding,32 or implement-
ing limited fee-for-service mechanisms that might satisfy the capitalistic
impulses of bureaucratic entrepreneurs.3 3 The government sector, how-
around the new equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and even society at
large." Id. at 35.
29. J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of "Social Entrepreneurship", CTR. ADVANCEMENT Soc.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 2-3 (May 30, 2001), http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees-sedef.pdf.
30. Kelley, supra note 17, at 339.
31. Id. at 340-41 (giving examples of "complex structures," such as "corporations with
multiple classes of stock and detailed shareholder agreements, or the creation of multiple
interlocking entities, or the use of delicately drafted joint venture agreements"). See generally
Fremont-Smith, supra note 26, for information on nonprofit and for-profit joint venturing.
32. The federal government's Social Innovation Fund provides capital to promising social-
benefit programs. This fund is authorized under the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act and
is managed by the Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, which was created by
executive order in 2009. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama to Request
$50 Million to Identify and Expand Effective, Innovative Non-Profits (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press..office/President-Obama-to-Request-50-Million-to-Identify-
and-Expand-Effective-Innovative-Nonprofits. Additionally, the White House Startup America
initiative will be providing matching capital, reducing regulation, connecting business mentors
with entrepreneurs, and considering tax reliefs and incentives for small businesses. See Startup
America, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america (last visited July 24,
2011). Other examples of government funding of charity, science, and social initiatives abound.
33. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-76 REVISED, 1, A3 (2003), available
at http://oam.eas.commerce.gov/docs/OMB%20Circular%20A-76%20REvised%202003.pdf.
"The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private sector for
needed commercial services," rather than perform a commercial activity itself. Id. at 1.
Nonetheless, the federal government does perform many activities ostensibly for public benefit,
including fee-for-service activities that generate funds outside of the federal budget and
appropriations process, and that subsequently can be used to reward high-performing (i.e., profit-
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ever, might serve better as a nest for social activists rather than social
entrepreneurs. Most social entrepreneurs who want to establish their
own legal entities will thus look to either the second sector of business
to set up a for-profit to do largely nonprofit work, or to the third sector
of nonprofit to set up a nonprofit organization that allows for for-profit
opportunities. The traditional legal forms tied to these second and third
sectors, however, have significant limitations for social entrepreneurs.
1. NONPROFIT ENTITY LIMITATIONS FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
Despite nonprofits' long history in the United States, no uniform
federal law of nonprofits exists, and comparatively little authoritative
law has been drafted specifically for nonprofits, with most legal treat-
ment of nonprofits found under federal tax law." Substantive nonprofit
law is generally a state law concern, with laissez-faire, nonprofit-corpo-
ration statutes usually permitting organizations to be formed for "any
lawful purpose,"" and with charitable trust law "accommodat[ing] a
broadly construed public purpose."3 6 The nonprofit laws that do exist
can present some stifling and severe restrictions to dampen the social
entrepreneurial spirit, namely the non-distribution constraint and the
various operating burdens of maintaining an exempt status.
generating) employees with compensation and bonuses. For example, certain areas within the
Government Accountability Office, Treasury Department, and Office of Personnel Management
run like private enterprises, with fee-for-service practices. See Kimberly Palmer, Report Criticizes
Fee-for-Service Contracting Operations, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.govexec.
com/dailyfed/0805/080205kl.htm; see also Products and Services for a Fee, U.S. OFF.
PERSONNEL MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/prodserv.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 1998).
34. Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 243, 244 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed.
2006) ("[C]ompared with the law governing business corporations-which is more fully
developed because of numerous suits by shareholders-it is not easy to say what 'the law' is in
the nonprofit sector. . . . [T]here is no single 'law of nonprofit organizations.'"). Other sources
that are of influential legal importance are the American Bar Association's Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, which was revised in 1987 (REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987)), and
recently also in 2008, (MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008)); and the American Law Institute's
project Principles of the Lw of Nonprofit Organizations, started in 2001 and still several years
from being complete. See Current Projects: Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations,
A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=3 (last visited July
16, 2011). For another comprehensive review of the laws and doctrines affecting nonprofits, see
generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004) (giving a comprehensive review of the laws and doctrines
affecting nonprofits). As Professor Kleinberger pointed out in his review of this article prior to its
publication, the federal tax law nonetheless does have a significant effect on nonprofits, with some
effects pertaining to issues that might not ordinarily seem to be tax-related, such as the duty of
care of nonprofit managers.
35. Brody, supra note 34, at 246.
36. Id. See also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.01 ("Every corporation
incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity unless a more
limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.").
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As the name implies, nonprofits are ipso juro prohibited from dis-
tributing profits or entertaining private ownership." This non-distribu-
tion constraint38 may dissuade some social entrepreneurs who feel that
they need not sacrifice income or equity while pursuing charitable pur-
pose. The non-distribution constraint also creates practical challenges in
attracting private capital, which, short of corporate philanthropy, often
demands income or equity. Securing debt is also an issue, as traditional
banks are reluctant to extend competitive-term loans to nonprofits
because of nonprofits' perceived inability of or risk for repayment.3 9
Even if a social entrepreneur accepts the personal financial con-
straints and capital-raising limitations associated with a public charity
form, maintaining a nonprofit status can be an onerous operating burden.
Engaging a nonprofit in any margin-generating activities could subject a
tax-exempt entity to the Internal Revenue Service's Operational Test,40
Commerciality Doctrine,' Unrelated Business Income Tax,4 2 and the
Commensurate in Scope Doctrine4 3-any of which can be fatal to the
organization's nonprofit and tax-exempt status.
The risk of injury is further exacerbated by the mixed messages of
what is expected of nonprofit charities. The U.S. free-market culture
increasingly expects charities to be entrepreneurial and more like com-
mercial enterprises, to be income-earning in order to be self-sufficient,
and to have as the goal social engineering beyond traditional charitable
notions of helping the poor and needy." On the other hand, U.S. laws
37. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 6.40; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (2009)
(prohibiting tax-exempt public charities from "operat[ing] for the benefit of private interests").
38. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
39. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 354.
40. See Kelley, supra note 6, at 2473 ("The operational test requires that an organization's
resources must be devoted to purposes that qualify as exclusively charitable within the meaning of
section 501(c)(3) of the [IRS] Code and the applicable regulations.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245.
41. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 25.1, at 629-30 (7th ed.
1998) ("The commerciality doctrine is essentially this: A tax-exempt organization is engaged in a
nonexempt activity when that activity is engaged in in a manner that is considered commercial.
An act is a commercial one if it has a direct counterpart in, or is conducted in the same manner as
is the case in the realm of for-profit organizations."). The Commerciality Doctrine is rather vague.
Kelley, supra note 6, at 2476.
42. Kelley, supra note 6, at 2483 (charities that engage in commercial activities not
"'substantially related' to the performance of their exempt purposes" may be subject to an
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT)) (citation omitted); see also I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006);
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2009).
43. Kelley, supra note 6, at 2486 ("[Ihf the reviewing authority applying the doctrine finds
that the organization's charitable program is 'commensurate in scope' with its financial resources,
it will uphold the organization's exemption, even if the money is being produced through an
activity that has nothing to do with the charitable mission."); accord Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1
C.B. 186.
44. See Kelley, supra note 6, at 2488.
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insist upon the non-commerciality of a nonprofit enterprise and passive
aggressively apply a traditional definition of charity as a visceral assess-
ment of tax-exempt qualification.4 5 These antagonistic expectations,
coupled with the lack of uniform nonprofit law mentioned earlier in this
section of the article," arguably create an operational and legal uncer-
tainty on how social entrepreneurs should utilize nonprofits. A few
recent examples of social entrepreneurs who chose the nonprofit form
may illustrate some non-distribution constraint and operating issues.
Atlas Service Corps, Inc. is a nonprofit that works as "a reverse
Peace Corps," where foreign charitable workers come to the U.S. to help
its citizens.4 7 Founded in 2006, Atlas Corps engages foreign leadership
"Fellows" in an international exchange of best practices, with Fellows
bringing their nonprofit leadership experiences to U.S. communities and
also learning practices in the United States to return as societal change
agents in their home communities." Founder and social entrepreneur
Scott Beale decided to organize this company as a nonprofit instead of a
for-profit, ostensibly driven more by mission than money.4 9 Atlas Corps
has managed to fund itself through the business, governmental, and non-
profit sectors by appealing to organizations, which need leaders and are
willing to pay for the Fellows, and by soliciting aid from governmental
and foundation sources. 0 The choice of a nonprofit form may be a good
fit in this scenario because the primary activity of providing fellowships
may not be easily commercialized,"' the target consumers are other non-
45. Id. ("When a charitable organization today engages in what an administrator or judge
feels is too much commerce-particularly where that organization combines commerce with a
charitable mission that does not focus on aiding the poor and distressed-that administrator or
judge will grasp for a legal mechanism to draw charity back toward its compassionate, Judeo-
Christian origins.").
46. See supra Part I.B.l.
47. Scott Beale, A "Reverse Peace Corps," SERVICEWORLD (Nov. 2, 2010), http://ourservice
world.org/2010/1 1/a-reverse-peace-corps/; see also Nation: Reverse Peace Corps, TIME, June 16,
1967, http://www.time.com/timelmagazine/article/0,9171,843931,00.html.
48. See Mission & Method, ATLAS CORPS, http://www.atlascorps.org/mission.html (last
visited Aug. 18, 2011).
49. See Thomas Heath, Value Added: The Nonprofit Entrepreneur, THE WAsHBiz BLOG
(Mar. 15, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/washbizblog/2009/03/value added_
17.html (quoting Scott Beale as saying, "I am just like a business entrepreneur, but instead of
making a big paycheck I try to make a big impact"). See also Ken Mammarella, The $13,000
CEO: Nonprofit Founder Scott Beale Doesn't Want a Lot of Money; He Wants a Better World,
DELAWARE ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20110811/NEWS/
108110356flhe-13-000-CEO (quoting Scott Beale as saying, "My life's ambition has never been
to have the most comfortable life but the one that makes the most difference").
50. Donors, ATLAS CORPs, http://www.atlascorps.org/individual.php (last visited Aug. 20,
2011).
51. Atlas Corps Founder and CEO Scott Beale explained that one of his "biggest hurdles" in
launching Atlas Corps was in receiving the designation from the U.S. government to be an
international exchange program, for which sponsor eligibility is detailed in the Mutual
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profits, and the founding entrepreneur may have no apparent interest in
financial gain for himself or for stakeholders.5 2 When the nonprofit's
activities can easily become commercialized and pecuniary conflicts of
interests develop, however, the nonprofit form can be a risky entity
choice.5 3 Like many other nonprofits, the growth of Atlas Corps is also
significantly limited by its ability to secure continual capital from dona-
tions or revenue from nonprofits, which would annually sponsor such
fellowships.
Consider also the micro-lending organization Kiva Microfunds,
Inc., which is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization based in San Fran-
cisco.54 Founded by Matthew Flannery and his wife Jessica in 2005,
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. See Career Spotlight: Scott Beale (C'98),
GEORGETOWN ALUMNI ONLINE, http://alumni.georgetown.eduldefault.aspx?page=CareerServices
SpotlightBeale (last visited Aug 30, 2011). See also 22 C.F.R. § 62 (2010).
52. Funding for Atlas Corps is from donations, which are largely from companies,
governments, foundations, individuals, and host organizations for which the Fellow will be
working. Id. Atlas Corps Fellows are considered volunteers who serve for twelve to eighteen
months and who are provided a living stipend of 130% of the poverty line for the community
where these Fellows will reside. For example, the Fellows in Washington, D.C., during the
2010-2011 year received $14,750 annually and $1,250 upon return to their home country. The
goal of fifty Fellows in 2011 means a cash outlay of $800,000 for volunteers and then additional
overhead expenses to manage the organization. Frequently Asked Questions, ATLAS CORPS, http://
www.atlascorps.org/faq.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
53. Angel Food Ministries is one example of a nonprofit that began seemingly with charitable
intentions by its founders, which has allegedly evolved into a significant commercial enterprise
enriching its founders, who have been under public and IRS scrutiny for excessive compensation.
Founded in 1994 by two pastors in Georgia, the nonprofit Angel Food Ministries (AFM)
distributes pre-packaged groceries at a low-cost to mostly indigent, church-attending consumers.
What is Angel Food Ministries?, ANGEL FOOD MINISTRIES, http://www.angelfoodministries.com/
about (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). In February 2009, the FBI raided the charity's home office in
Georgia, seizing unspecified documents. Joe Johnson, FBI Searches Angel Food Ministries, Seizes
Documents, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/
021209/new_387279000.shtml. The IRS found that the pastors and their two sons showed "an
astonishing jump in salaries in a recent one-year period," from $322,755 in 2005 to $2.1 million in
2006. Id. The pastor CEO's recent $764,840 compensation in 2008 for managing a $138 million
organization far exceeded the salary of the top executive of the nonprofit foodbank Feeding
America (formerly America's Second Harvest), who received $417,799 in compensation for
managing a $635 million budget. Melissa Nann Burke, Nonprofit Angel Food Ministries'
Finances Still Under Scrutiny, YORK DAILY REc., Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.ydr.com/ci_140735
95. Additionally, the AFM executives, substantially composed of family members, did significant
business with other family businesses at seemingly above-market-rate transactions and also
retained a private jet and a personal chef. Id. One nonprofit attorney observed that "it's hard to tell
whether AFM has a charitable purpose or it's a purely commercial venture." Id. This nonprofit is
currently under investigation by federal and state authorities, and is embroiled in litigation for its
business practices. Id. Unlike the founder of Atlas Corps, the AFM founders had a food business
that was easy to commercialize and use to generate margins, and they had a strong interest in
financially rewarding themselves.
54. About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); see also infra
Part III.C.3.
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Kiva was originally intended to be an LLC. 5 The founders wanted Kiva
to receive loans rather than donations, but given the legal issues around
securitization and charging interest, they "decided that the 501(c)(3) sta-
tus would help [them] form a bond with [their] users and raise a small
amount of donation capital to get the idea off the ground."56 With over a
half-million Kiva contributors who have loaned over $200 million to
almost a million Kiva users, the organization seems to remain on a path
for success as measured by social impact." One of the advantages that
nonprofits have over for-profit firms, however, is the signal of trustwor-
thiness that arises from the non-distribution constraint.5 8 The public per-
ceives nonprofits to be more trustworthy, because nonprofits arguably
"have less incentive to profit at the expense of consumers than do [for-
profits]."59 Kiva proclaimed that it allowed for peer-to-peer lending, but
when the New York Times reported that individuals were not in fact
making microloans directly to borrowers but rather to Kiva's
microfinance institution partners, which in turn made such loans en
masse, a question arose about how Kiva monies were really being
used.6 0 "Where [Kiva's] homepage once promised, 'Kiva lets you lend
to a specific entrepreneur, empowering them to lift themselves out of
poverty,' [the website] now simply states, 'Kiva connects people
through lending to alleviate poverty."' 6 1 Though Kiva ultimately pro-
vides loans to those in need and the company continues to reach opera-
tional milestones, the danger of public expectation may be a concern that
is more pronounced in the nonprofit form. Furthermore, whether Kiva
would have been or could still be propelled to greater financial heights
by attracting capital-endowed equity investors is unknown, but undoubt-
edly a convenient entity form that allowed for charitable purpose and
55. Matthew Flannery, Kiva and the Birth of Person-to-Person Microfinance, INNOVATIONS,
Winter & Spring 2007, at 31.
56. Id. at 39, 53-54.
57. See Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.orglabout/stats (last updated Aug. 18, 2011). The
executive compensation for Kiva's top executives also seemed reasonable, with the CEO and
President of Kiva each reporting total compensation of under $150,000. More details are disclosed
in the 2009 Form 990. See Kiva Microfunds, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax
(2009) Financial Statements December 31, 2009 and 2008, http://na3.salesforce.com/servlet/
servlet.FileDownloadPkb?fle=OOP50000004ty2E&orgd=OOD500000006svl&pPid=501500000
OOJ8KO.
58. See Hansmann, supra note 38, at 873.
59. See HELMUT K. ANHEIER, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 124 (2005).
60. Stephanie Strom, Confusion on Where Money Lent via Kiva Goes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2009, at B6. Timothy Ogden, editor in chief of Philanthropy Action, commented, "There's a
whole new generation of socially connected nonprofits that use the Internet to make the illusion of
person-to-person contact much more believable . . . . The problem is that they are no more
connecting donors to people than the child sponsorship organizations of the past did." Id.
61. Id. Kiva's President said "he could foresee a day when Kiva really [could] provide
person-to-person" loans. Id.
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investor return would have been strongly considered by Kiva's founders
at the company's inception.
2. FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LIMITATIONS FOR
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
Corporate entities can offer social entrepreneurs considerable oper-
ational and financial latitude. A social entrepreneur might choose to
incorporate a business and engage in social benefit through corporate
social responsibility, cause marketing, and corporate philanthropy-all
of which can be important activities for any corporation. A more diffi-
cult challenge, however, would be to prioritize or rationalize charitable
purpose above shareholder value. As some recent legal disputes suggest,
a social entrepreneur may be unable to escape the financial and fiduciary
confines of a corporate form that is ultimately obligated to shareholders.
Ben & Jerry's is one of the most famous for-profit corporations
with a social mission. The company "advanced its social mission in
many ways, such as by committing 7.5% of its profits to a charitable
foundation; conducting in-store voter registration; and buying ingredi-
ents from suppliers who employed disadvantaged populations."6 2 In
2000, Ben & Jerry's was sold to Unilever, a large multi-national con-
glomerate, which did not have a social reputation equal to or arguably
approaching Ben & Jerry's.63 While the founders of Ben & Jerry's may
have overestimated the actual legal risks involved in resisting an acquisi-
tion by Unilever, the founders claimed that they did not really want to
sell the company to Unilever, and that "corporate law made them do
it."64 Without delving into the complexity of fiduciary duties in a take-
over context, the takeaway from the Ben & Jerry's example is that the
founders of a charitably focused, for-profit corporation felt pressured
into choosing between possible loss or dilution of the company's social
mission and potential legal liability.6 5 When faced with a decision of
battling for their independence to continue their social mission or taking
the road of least resistance and deferring to shareholders and the acquir-
ing company, Ben and Jerry walked.
Even social entrepreneurs who are willing to fight "the good fight"
to preserve their community-first business may find that accepting
investors, even minority investors, can result in the form of the corpora-
62. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale
of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REv. 211, 211 (2010) (citation omitted).
63. See id. at 211-12; see also Kelley, supra note 17, at 360.
64. Page & Katz, supra note 62, at 230 (citations omitted).
65. We agree with Page & Katz on the point that the Ben & Jerry's founders could have
properly resisted a takeover, but the founders would have likely had to couch their defense in
terms of leading to long-term shareholder value. Id. at 231.
14 [Vol. 66:1
PURPOSE WITH PROFIT
tion usurping the function of the business. In the 2010 Delaware Court
of Chancery case of eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, two share-
holders of craigslist had a dispute with the company's only other share-
holder, eBay.66 In recounting the facts of the case, the court recognized
that craigslist, which offers the most-used classifieds website in the
United States, "largely operates its business as a community service"
and "does not expend any great effort seeking to maximize its profits.""7
When eBay decided to make a competing foray into online classified
advertising, the craigslist shareholders asked eBay to sell its minority
stake back to craigslist or to a third party "who would be compatible
with . . . craigslist's unique corporate culture."" Rebuffed by eBay and
unable to rid itself of its profit-minded partner, the craigslist sharehold-
ers enacted a number of defensive measures to inhibit or restrict the
influence of eBay's share position.69 eBay claimed that the craigslist
directors and controlling stockholders breached their fiduciary duties by
enacting the defensive measures, and the court largely agreed with eBay,
ordering a rescission of a majority of the challenged measures.70
The court provided insight into the ultimate purpose of for-profit
companies when it unambiguously stated, "[p]romoting, protecting, or
pursuing non-stockholder considerations must lead at some point to
value for stockholders."" The court continued, stating that "[tlhe corpo-
rate form in which craigslist operates . . . is not an appropriate vehicle
for purely philanthropic ends" and "[h]aving chosen a for-profit corpo-
rate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and
standards that accompany that form."7 2 The court concluded that
because the defendants chose the for-profit corporate form, they must
"promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers."73 Though social entrepreneurs who choose the corporate form can
66. 16 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2010).
67. Id. at 7-8. The court also recognized that craigslist allowed classified advertisements to
be placed on its websites free of charge, did not "sell advertising space on its website to third
parties," and did not "market its services," with nearly all revenue coming from certain online job
postings and apartment listings in New York City. Id. The shareholders had expected eBay to
"show appreciation for craigslist's unique mission and philosophy." Id. at 15.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7. Defensive measdres, such as those analyzed in eBay, are subject to enhanced
scrutiny under Delaware law.
71. Id. at 33. The eBay court also reasoned, "Ultimately, defendants failed to prove that
craigslist possesses a palpable, distinctive, and advantageous culture that sufficiently promotes
stockholder value to support the indefinite implementation of a poison pill. [The defendants] did
not make any serious attempt to prove that the craigslist culture, which rejects any attempt to
further monetize its services, translates into increased profitability for stockholders." Id.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id.
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exercise significant flexibility, the ultimate obligation in corporations to
maximize shareholder value may be enforceable over the social
mission.7 4
3. FOR-PROFIT LLC LIMITATIONS FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
Instead of establishing a corporate entity, many social entrepre-
neurs choose to create a limited liability company ("LLC"), which
enjoys contractual flexibility in organizational form, lighter reporting
requirements, and pass-through taxation." Social entrepreneurs wanting
to establish a social enterprise, however, may find that the LLC is not an
optimal vehicle for several reasons.
One problem of forming social enterprises as LLCs is branding. A
company appended with "LLC" does not immediately identify the entity
as a social enterprise and may connote profit motives. 76 As discussed
previously,77 the non-distribution constraint of nonprofits signals a level
of trustworthiness in these institutions78 and a labeling of these entities
as "nonprofit," "not-for-profit," or "501(c)(3)" communicates a valuable
message that this entity prioritizes charitable or social purpose. On the
other hand, for-profit entities engaged in social benefit-through their
vision, mission, or programs-must still overcome suspicion so that the
public and potential investors understand the difference between a "good
company" and just "good marketing."7  Not only does an LLC suffix
predispose the public into assuming that such a social enterprise is pri-
marily for-profit with charitable purpose as a residual benefit, but such a
branding signal may also be confusing both to foundations and private
74. For an analysis of a different example, where a corporation created a unit within its
company (and not a separate legal entity) for charitable purposes, consider Google's establishment
of Google.org, as examined in Christopher Lim, Google.org, For-Profit Charitable Entity:
Another Smart Decision by Google, 17 KAN. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 28 (2008). Without a legal entity
separation between Google.org and Google, Google.org could be forced to resign or diminish its
charitable purpose if Google's board made such a decision. See generally id.
75. Brewer & Rhim, supra note 17, at 14.
76. Professor Kleinberger in his review of this article observes that "[s]uch branding has
never been the function of the law of business organizations" and that numerous and powerful
private means, such as the Sullivan Principles and Halo Awards, exist for such branding purposes.
We recognize, however, that while branding may not be an explicit consideration in developing
organizational forms, the organizational form suffix appended to a for-profit organization's name
may invite profit-making assumptions by consumers and investors. A legal entity type, such as the
L3C, acknowledges the focus on social purpose over profit and could also signal a distinction in
legal duties owed. Furthermore, start-up organizations are rarely sufficiently mature in
infrastructure or results to qualify for industry accolades, such as the Halo Awards. L3Cs are
recognized from their inception as entities with social purpose, and unlike for-profit forms, have
that social purpose woven into the form's DNA.
77. See supra Part I.B.l.
78. See Hansmann, supra note 38, at 873.
79. See Billitteri, supra note 9, at 9-10.
16 [Vol. 66:1
PURPOSE WITH PROFIT
investors. Foundations may not immediately recognize certain LLCs as
potential charitable-focused entities eligible for investment, and private
investors may not be expecting the below-market returns often associ-
ated with social enterprises if the organization is formed as a traditional
LLC. Not surprisingly, many social entrepreneurs argue that a distinct
brand for hybrid organizations is needed for gaining support from the
general public and for increasing access to various sources of charitable,
governmental, and private capital."o
Another problem in choosing the LLC form for social enterprises is
the lack of assurance that an LLC is either intended to be or will remain
an organization committed to charitable primacy." The attribute of con-
tractual flexibility that makes the LLC prized by entrepreneurs is the
same characteristic that should give pause to social entrepreneurs, who
may want to ensure that their company prioritizes its charitable purpose.
Social investors and the public may have similar concerns about an LLC
form, its articles of organization, and operating agreement, which could
be altered to a dramatic change in organizational course, especially in a
change of control situation.82
The obstacle in raising capital is sometimes said to be the most
significant challenge for social entrepreneurs who turn to existing for-
profit forms.8 3 Charitably inclined, for-profit entities face difficulties in
attracting individual or institutional investors, who want market rates of
return that "multi-bottom-line organizations are rarely in a position to
offer."84 Social entrepreneurs using for-profit forms, such as the LLC,
also generally find themselves cut-off from sources that traditionally
have funded charitable causes, namely foundations and governments.
Foundations in particular are at tax and public-image risk if they make a
program-related investment ("PRI") in such for-profit endeavors that
does not qualify as a PRI.86 Even if informed investments are made in
existing social enterprise forms, particularly vexing is ensuring that a
80. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 361 (citations omitted).
81. The statutory language enabling L3Cs assures investors that the form requires
commitment to charitable primacy. Currently, however, investors in L3Cs have little assurance
that the form will remain an L3C. Our recommended solutions to this issue are addressed in Part
HI.D.
82. See infra Part IlI.D for discussion on proposed safeguards for socially invested capital
when an L3C experiences a change of control or converts to a profit-focused LLC.
83. SUSTAINABIrTY LTD., GROWING OPPORTUNITY: ENTREPRENEURIAL SOLUTIONS TO
INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS, 4, 15 (2007), available at http://tidescanada.org/wp-content/uploads/files/
causeway/GrowingOpportunity.pdf. The top five challenges cited by social entrepreneurs were,
in order of most to least challenging: accessing capital, promoting/marketing, maturing/
professionalizing, recruiting talent, and adapting to landscape. Id.
84. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 354 (citing SUSTAINABILTrry LTD., supra note 83, at 18).
85. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 354.
86. See Billitteri, supra note 9, at 5-6.
2011] 17
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
portion, if not all, of the enterprise capital will be locked into the "social
stream" and not be converted into private wealth.
Difficulties in branding, locking in charitable capital, and raising
capital, however, are not necessarily enough to dissuade some social
entrepreneurs from engaging the LLC form for their enterprises. Some
entrepreneurs may feel that their marketing can overcome choice of
entity, that legal and operating measures can ease the concerns of inves-
tors and the public, and that a business model with a lack of dependence
on donations, grants, and PRIs make the capital-raising issue no more
challenging than any other enterprise. What have been deal-breaking
deterrents for many social entrepreneurs, however, are the legal com-
plexity and cost of setting up an LLC that can prioritize charitable pur-
pose and that can contract around fiduciary duties and financial
obligations to LLC members.
4. ExISTING ENTITY WORKAROUNDS FOR SoCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
For social entrepreneurs who want to dovetail social benefit and
business, more complex arrangements-which might be patched
together through existing legal mechanisms, such as joint ventures struc-
tured as corporations, partnerships, or LLCs, or cooperative agreements
among individuals, nonprofit, and corporate entities-can be ideal but
are also expensive, time-consuming, and sometimes still not an assur-
ance of legitimacy." Social entrepreneurs who want charitable purpose
as an inextricable part of their operations will need, among other things,
expert and invariably costly legal counsel in creating and maintaining
the organization." Some social enterprises have also satisfied their dual-
purpose ambitions through multiple-entity arrangements, most notably
for-profits with nonprofit subsidiaries or nonprofits with for-profit sub-
sidiaries. Such arrangements, however, have encountered litigation risk,
tax issues, and criticism by social advocates.
Corporations engaged in corporate philanthropy or corporate social
responsibility sometimes form their own nonprofit organizations or
foundations. In 2006, social entrepreneur Blake Mycoskie created
TOMS Shoes Inc. at least partly motivated by the idea of providing foot-
wear to shoeless children. 9 The company matches every pair of shoes
purchased from it with a pair of new shoes given to a child in need, and
as of September 2010, TOMS Shoes has given away over one million
87. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 341 (citation omitted).
88. For example, "charitable LLCs" can also "be structured as a partnership or joint venture
with the charitable activity free from income taxes" though "IRS rules severely limit the
circumstances" for this approach. Billitteri, supra note 9, at 6.




pairs of shoes.9o To deliver these shoes, TOMS Shoes operates its
501(c)(3) nonprofit affiliate, Friends of TOMS." TOMS Shoes, how-
ever, has received a fair amount of criticism 92 for using the plight of
children as an alleged marketing ploy to generate profits, 9 3 "greenwash-
ing"94 its image, making little social impact, and potentially doing more
harm than good. 9 5 TOMS Shoes describes itself as a "for-profit company
with giving at its core,"96 and despite the best intentions of a for-profit
company to further philanthropy, such companies are often met with
skepticism. 97
Another alternative is for a nonprofit to create a for-profit, corpo-
rate subsidiary. In 2005, "the Mozilla Foundation, a non-profit public
benefit software development organization, launched a wholly owned
subsidiary, the Mozilla Corporation," which serves as the for-profit
vehicle for the Firefox Internet browser.98 In 2008, the Mozilla Founda-
tion announced that the IRS had launched a review of the foundation's
tax-exempt status for 2003 and 2004, and in 2009, the IRS expanded its
investigation to subsequent tax years. 99 The Mozilla Foundation argued
that search revenues it received were royalties that should not be taxed
and eventually settled with the IRS on a penalty for some of those tax
90. One for One-Official Store, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/our-movement/
movement-one-for-one (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
91. Our Commitment, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/movement-our-commitment (last
visited Aug. 18, 2011).
92. Jeff Rosenthal, Products with Purpose Will Change the World, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 27, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-rosenthal/products-with-purpose-
wil b 437917.html. See also Megan Hoye, Are TOMS Shoes Best Fit for Philanthropy?: Better
Ways to Give Efficiently, THE FALCON, Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.thefalcononline.com/article.
phpid=6589.
93. Krystina Martinez, Students Bring Some Criticism for Shoe Program, THE PRAIRIE, Apr.
26, 2011, http://www.theprairienews.com/2011/04/26/students-bring-criticism-shoe-program/.
94. About Greenwashing, GREENWASHING INDEX, http://www.greenwashingindex.com/what.
php (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) (Greenwashing is "when a company or organization spends more
time and money claiming to be 'green' through advertising and marketing than actually
implementing business practices that minimize environmental impact.").
95. Zac Mason, Do You Cause More Harm Than Good by Giving TOMS Shoes to the Poor?,
ZACSTRAVAGANZA! (Oct. 4, 2010, 10:28 AM), http://zacstravaganza.blogspot.com/2010/10/does-
toms-cause-more-harm-than-good-by.html.
96. TOMS Frequently Asked Questions, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/faq (last visited
Aug. 18, 2011).
97. Ellen McHugh, A Closer Look at TOMS, THE FINE PRINT (May 1, 2011), http://www.the
fineprintuf.org/2011/05/01/a-closer-look-at-toms/.
98. Mozilla Foundation Reorganization, MOZILLA, http://www-archive.mozilla.org/reorgani
zation (last modified Aug. 5, 2005); The State of Mozilla: Sustainability, MOZILLA (Nov. 18,
2010) http://www.mozilla.org/foundation/annualreport/2009/sustainability.html.
99. Cade Metz, Mozilla Millions Still 86% Google Cash: Mountain View Sugar Daddy Tax
Audit Rolls on, THE REGISTER (Nov. 18, 2010, 8:53 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/
18/google still-mozilla sugar.daddy/.
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years, with other tax issues still unresolved.oo
Other workarounds include social enterprise designations, such as
B-Corp certification,o' and newer hybrid legal forms, such as the Bene-
fit Corporation,102 the Flexible Purpose Corporation, 0  the Benefit
LLC, " and the L3C. o' The demand for hybrid forms is also advancing
on the international front, with entities such as the Community Interest
100. Steve Bobson, Mozilla Issues Audited Financials, Faces Audit by IRS, INAUDIT (Nov. 19,
2010), http://inaudit.com/auditlexternal-audit/mozilla-issues-audited-financials-faces-audit-by-irs-
2083; Hood & Strong LLP, MOzILLA FOUNDATION AND SUBSIDIARIES DECEMBER 31, 2009 AND
2008: INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT AND CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 15 (Aug.
23, 2010), http://www.mozilla.org/foundation/documents/mf-2009-audited-financial-statement.
pdf.
101. A Certified B-Corp or Certified B-Corporation is a voluntary certification process run by
B Lab. Any company, even an L3C, may apply for a B-Corporation designation and may maintain
such a designation through adherence to certain social and environmental standards and regular
self-reporting, providing alleged branding advantages. See B Corporation-FAQ, B CORP., http://
www.bcorporation.net/faq (last visited July 24, 2011). As of July 24, 2011, 427 B-Corps were in
existence. See B-CORP, http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited July 27, 2011). A B-Corp differs
from a new statutory form called the Benefit Corporation. See infra note 97; see also Minnigh,
supra note 15.
102. A Benefit Corporation is a statutory form of corporation that is created to provide a
general public benefit, though such a benefit is not necessarily a section 170(c)(2)(B)-exempt
purpose. See Minnigh, supra note 15 ("A general public benefit is defined as 'a material, positive
impact on society and the environment, as measured by a third-party standard, through activities
that promote a combination of specific public benefits.'" (citation omitted)); Benefit
Corporation-Legal Provisions & FAQs, B-Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/
documents/Benefit%20Corporation%20-%2OLegal%2OProvisions%20and%20FAQ.pdf (last
visited Aug. 1, 2011) ("A Benefit Corporation: 1) has a corporate purpose to create a material
positive impact on society and the environment; 2) has an expanded fiduciary duty that requires
consideration of non-financial interests when making decision; and 3) reports on its overall social
and environmental performance as assessed against a third party standard."). As of August 1,
2011, statutes for Benefit Corporations have been adopted in five states: Hawaii, Maryland, New
Jersey, Vermont and Virginia. Public Policy, B-CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011). At least six other states (California, Colorado, Michigan, New York,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania) have pending legislation regarding Benefit Corporations. Id.
103. The Flexible Purpose Corporation will permit a corporation's board of directors to engage
in charitable purpose; specifically, the corporation is required to include charitable and public
purpose activities that could be carried out by a nonprofit corporation. See S. 201 (Ca. 2001),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/l1-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb 201_bill_20110314
amendedsen v98.pdf. The bill was approved overwhelmingly by the California Senate by a vote
of 37-1 and now moves to the California Assembly. Ken Priore, Flexible Purpose Corporation,
CAL. BUS. ATT'y BLOG (June 10, 2011), http://www.thecalifomiabusinessattorney.com/20l1/06/
10/flexible-purpose-corporation.
104. The Benefit LLC will allow for an LLC to put social or environmental causes ahead of
profit-making and protect against LLC member lawsuits. On May 19, 2011, the Maryland
Governor signed the Benefit LLC into law, to be effective on June 1, 2011. See S. 595 2011 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/201 lrs/billfile/sb0595.htm.
105. See infra Part I.C.
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Company ("CIC")0 6 and Social Enterprise LLP ("SELLP"),'0 7 both
developing recently in the United Kingdom.
5. EVALUATING NONPROFIT, FOR-PROFIT, AND
WORKAROUND SOLUTIONS
A social entrepreneur may choose a nonprofit form when the per-
ception of "mission above all else," a prohibition on profiteering, the
tax-deductibility of donations, and the non-taxing of income, are essen-
tial attributes for the organization. The non-distribution constraint limi-
tations on income and equity, however, can deter engagement by
employees, investors, and lenders, and the maintenance of a tax-exempt
nonprofit status reduces operational flexibility. Most significantly, the
limitations of the social sector fail "to foster, support, and scale innova-
tion."10 As professor Clayton Christensen of the Harvard Business
School recently observed, "Fundamental shifts need to occur in the
structure of the social sector in order for systems of innovation to truly
take hold."lO9
A social entrepreneur may choose a corporate or LLC form when
the following considerations are prevalent: when highly desirable or cru-
cial activities include generating financial returns and developing equity;
when having operational flexibility is paramount; and when raising
investor capital is required. Traditional corporate forms, as demonstrated
by Ben & Jerry's and craigslist above,"o must ultimately prioritize
shareholder wealth over social mission, and even LLC forms have simi-
lar obligations unless otherwise specified.
Social entrepreneurs who want to ensure charitable primacy, while
allowing for maximum flexibility in pursuing profit, are often led to an
LLC form with socially focused specifications and safeguards. Creating
one of these custom, socially focused LLCs is inconvenient, time-con-
suming, and expensive. For many social entrepreneurs, crafting single or
multiple-entity LLC vehicles to deliver social value exacerbates an
already low-profit proposition.
106. See generally Stephen Lloyd, Transcript, Creating the CIC, 35 VT. L. REv. 31 (2010);
Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Community Interest Companies: Frequently Asked
Questions, BIS: DEP'T FOR Bus http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets/FAQ%20-%20
October%202009%20V7.00%20Final.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2009).
107. See Stephen Lloyd, The Social Enterprise LLP-What Is It; and What Is It For?,
BARRISTER MAG. (2010) http://www.barristermagazine.com/article-listing/current-issue/the-
social-enterprise-llp-%E2%80%93-what-is-it;-and-what-is-it-for.html.
108. Clayton M. Christensen et al., The White House Office on Social Innovation: A New
Paradigm for Solving Social Problems, THE HUFFINGTON PosT (July 1, 2009, 9:39 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/clayton-m-christensen/the-white-house-office-on_b_223759.html.
109. Id.
110. See supra Part I.B.2.
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The most compelling solution may be fourth-sector hybrid forms
for social enterprises, which have built-in nonprofit attributes and for-
profit allowances and which avail themselves to scrutiny and interpreta-
tion under the penumbra of existing legal doctrines. An ideal hybrid for
the social entrepreneur would offer advantages or clarity in branding,
governance, enforcement, and capital-raising. A contender for that man-
tle, the low-profit limited liability company, shows early promise and an
equal measure of formidable challenges.
C. Novelty and Impact of the L3C Form
One of the newest breeds of social enterprise, the low-profit limited
liability company, or L3C, attempts to overcome social entrepreneurs'
perceived shortcomings of existing nonprofit and for-profit forms while
preserving the most compelling aspects of each form to create a best-of-
both-worlds approach. Called the "for-profit with a nonprofit soul," the
L3C is essentially a for-profit business that must be driven primarily by
charitable purpose.'" The L3C differs in three key ways from existing
legal structures. First, L3Cs by statute must use the distinct L3C suffix
in identifying itself, which has an impact on branding.112 Second, L3C
statutes mandate charitable primacy by adopting, nearly verbatim et lite-
ratim, program-related investment (PRI) language, which stipulates that
L3Cs are in existence only because of "one or more charitable or educa-
tion purposes" and "[n]o significant purpose of the company is the pro-
duction of income or the appreciation of property.""' Third, the hybrid
legal form of the L3C purportedly allows it to attract nonprofit capital
via foundation PRIs and for-profit private investor capital through a
tranche investment mechanism; that is, given that most social enterprises
average "low-profit" (below-market) returns, near market-rate returns
may be offered to private investors if foundations will accept grant-like,
near-zero-rate returns. These L3C attributes have various effects with
important advantages and caveats. In the following sub-sections, we will
examine some of these attributes using the convenient framework of the
first L3C statutory provisions, as adopted by Vermont in 2008.
1. THE L3C BRAND
The name of a low-profit limited liability company . .. shall con-
tain the abbreviation L3C or 13c.' 14
111. Robert Lang, What is the L3C?, AMS. FOR CMTY DEv., http://www.americansfor
communitydevelopment.org/downloads/What%20is%20the%20L3C-101010.pdf (last visited
Aug. 11, 2011).
112. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001(27), 3005(a), 3023(a) (2011).
113. Id. § 3001(27). Other state L3C statutes reflect the substantially similar PRI language.
114. Id. § 3005(a)(2).
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Many social entrepreneurs believe that their fourth-sector enter-
prises need to be seen as entirely unique charitable and capitalistic enti-
ties, to be differentiated from nonprofits, which are perceived to be less
efficient than for-profits, and to be differentiated from for-profits, which
are fixated primarily on financial value. The creator of the L3C writes
that "[p]robably more importantly than anything else, the L3C is a brand
which signifies to the world that it puts mission before profit yet is self
sustaining. As a brand it makes these concepts easy to grasp and thereby
will be frequently used.""' The unique L3C designation allows social
enterprises to distinguish themselves by name from other legal forms
(e.g., The Paradigm Project, L3C), and offers an opportunity for all
social entrepreneurs to work collectively to build their own coherent and
respected brands." 6 An L3C brand puts the public on notice of the
pursuit of "[b]lended value,""' and signals investors to temper their
expected financial returns.
2. L3C TRANSLITERATION OF PRI LANGUAGE FOR CHARITABLE AND
FINANCIAL PURPOSES
A second attribute of L3Cs is their mandate on charitable primacy
through the adoption of certain program-related investment (PRI) lan-
guage. The Vermont L3C statutory provisions of title 11, section 3001
of the Vermont Statutes Annotated reads:
(27) "L3C" or "low-profit limited liability company" means a person
organized under this chapter that is organized for a business purpose
that satisfies and is at all times operated to satisfy each of the follow-
ing requirements:
(A) The company:
(i) significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charita-
ble or educational purposes within the meaning of Section
170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(B); and
(ii) would not have been formed but for the company's relationship to
the accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.
(B) No significant purpose of the company is the production of
income or the appreciation of property; provided, however, that the
fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation
115. Lang, supra note 111.
116. Arguably, the similarity of the L3C moniker to the widely used LLC designation suggests
the L3C's heritage is a for-profit LLC variant, whereas the juxtaposed "3" connotes a distinctive
and modem entity.
117. Jed Emerson, The Nature of Returns: A Social Capital Markets Inquiry into Elements of
Investment and the Blended Value Proposition 30 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Soc. Enters. Series,
Working Paper No. 17, 2000).
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shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a
significant purpose involving the production of income or the appre-
ciation of property. 18
Before turning to the impact and interpretation of these provisions, it
may be useful to give some background on PRIs, explain what PRI lan-
guage was transliterated, and evaluate the appropriateness of such lan-
guage as L3C statutory provisions.
a. Program-Related Investments ("PRIs") Background
Program-related investments ("PRIs")"' have been part of the U.S.
law of charitable giving since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which cre-
ated a distinction between public charities and private foundations and
restructured some rules surrounding them.12 0 As a general rule, founda-
tions are prohibited from making jeopardy investments.12 ' Jeopardy
investments are investments in which the market risks overwhelm a pru-
dent investment standard.1 22 An exception to the prohibition against
foundations engaging in jeopardy investment is a PRI, which is a debt or
equity investment by a private foundation in socially beneficial activi-
ties, regardless of whether the activities are performed by a nonprofit or
for-profit entity.' 2 3 A PRI must meet three criteria: (1) the foundation
must be motivated solely by a desire to further its exempt charitable
purpose;12 4 (2) the production of income or the appreciation of property
may not be a significant factor behind the foundation's investment; and
(3) only limited lobbying purposes, and no electioneering, may be
served by the investments.125 If the private foundation satisfies these
three criteria and has in place expenditure oversight requirements of
reporting or other means to monitor its investment, the foundation may
invest in the socially beneficial venture with an expectation that capital
will be returned at a below-market interest rate on a risk-adjusted basis,
typically 1% to 4%.126 Furthermore, the investment itself will count
towards IRS requirements that foundations annually spend 5% of their
118. § 3001. Other state statutes have slight but inconsequential variations in wording.
119. I.R.C. § 4944 (2006).
120. James P. Joseph, Program-Related Investments and You-Perfect Together?, TAX'N
ExEMVrs, Mar--Apr. 2010, at 10.
121. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-t(a)(2)(i) (1973).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The purposes are in § 170(c)(2)(B) of the Code (e.g. "religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational").
125. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1).
126. Francie Body et al., Current Practices in Program-Related Investing, BRODY WEISER
BURNs 2, http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Family Foundations/Financial-Management/Curre
nt-Practices-in-PRI.pdf (last visted Aug. 18, 2011).
24 [Vol. 66:1
PURPOSE WITH PROFIT
net worth annually. 127
Social entrepreneurs have argued that foundations are risk-averse in
making PRIs, given high transaction costs and substantial financial
risks.128 Currently, PRI regulations may not appear to meet the specific
needs of fourth sector enterprises, as PRIs were conceived at a time
when the concept of nonprofit/for-profit hybrids did not exist and social
investment was much more limited than it is today. 129 Additionally, IRS
guidance on acceptable PRIs is limited and narrow.' 30 A reexamination
of PRI effectiveness and any subsequent changes should be done
through Congress enacting new legislation or the IRS issuing rulings. In
fact, L3C proponents have already petitioned Congress with a proposal
for a Philanthropic Facilitation Act, which includes proposed amend-
ments to the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations thereunder
to clarify and facilitate PRIs to L3Cs.' 3 '
"[O]nly one known public [revenue] ruling has been released"
regarding PRIs. 13 2 It involved a foundation that provided low-interest
rate loans to blind persons to allow them to establish their own busi-
nesses. 3 "Because the foundation was created to aid blind persons to
secure gainful employment, and the blind persons were unable to secure
similar market loans through commercial sources, the investment was
characterized as a PRI."l 34 The IRS has also "issued only one [known]
private letter ruling concerning a PRI to a [LLC]."'" In that private
letter ruling, the IRS stated that a foundation investment in an LLC may
qualify as a PRI, so long as the foundation could exercise its expenditure
127. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 356.
128. See Brewer & Rhim, supra note 17, at 12.
129. Kelley, supra note 17, at 357; see also I.R.C. § 4944 (2006).
130. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (providing illustrative examples of acceptable and
unacceptable investments).
131. The Philanthropic Facilitation Act is coordinated through the Americans for Community
Development, led by the L3C founder Bob Lang. See Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2010,
AMNS. FOR CMTY. DEv., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/Philanthropic
FacilitationAct2010.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
132. Bishop, supra note 18, at 261-62 (citing Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-1 C.B. 380).
133. Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-1 C.B. 380.
134. Bishop, supra note 18, at 261 (citing Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-1 C.B. 380).
135. The IRS has found a valid PRI in other private letter rulings, including I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2001-36-026 (Mar. 10, 2006) (investment in economic development); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2000-43-050 (Oct. 27, 2000) (deposit and loan guaranty); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-43-058 (Oct.
29, 1999) (below market-rate loan in foreign business); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-33-063 (May 24,
1990) (participation interest in a letter of credit to secure favorable bond rating); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 87-10-076 (Dec. 10, 1986) (investment in limited partnership that provides capital to other
businesses); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-01-110 (Oct. 8, 1982) (construction loan in a blighted area);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-41-025 (July 20, 1981) (low-income housing loan); & I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 80-30-079 (Apr. 30, 1980) (urban renewal loan).
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oversight requirements to monitor the LLC's use of PRI funds. 13 6 Other
facts of note in the case were that the foundation's purpose was congru-
ous with the LLC's investment purpose, the foundation's rate of return
was predicted to be lower than comparable market investments, and the
foundation's rate and risk were the same as those of other members of
the LLC.'37
b. L3C Transliteration of PRI Language
In sanctioning the use of PRIs, Congress wanted to encourage foun-
dation investments in certain charitable activities conducted by for-
profit, or rather, not exclusively nonprofit, organizations.' 3  Congress,
however, likely did not contemplate that, one day, an entire organiza-
tional form would spring up and tie its very existence to the PRI
requirements.
One important distinction between the original PRI language 39 and
the transliterated L3C statutes is a change in certain words. 4 0 Whereas
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) refers to "investment," L3C statutes
replaced every instance of "investment" with "company."' 4 ' This
change means that it is not just a single investable activity that must
qualify as a PRI, but rather that the L3C company, as a whole, must
qualify as a PRI. In other words, the L3C as a company must further a
charitable purpose and simultaneously not have the production of
income or the appreciation of profit as a significant purpose. Though
some critics have cited that holding the entire company to the high and
conflicting standards of PRI qualification is unattainable and a fatal error
136. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020 (Mar. 10, 2006); see also Kleinberger & Callison,
infra note 142; Tyler, infra note 142, at 121 n.18.
137. See id.
138. In examining the original congressional bills prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the
legislative intent of PRIs is minimally articulated, with Congress only recognizing that
foundations should be able to invest, and not merely grant, in ways that could recoup a charitable
investment that could be reshown in furtherance of the foundation's mission. The House report
mentions only that the same rationale for allowing tax exemptions for donations which help
charities is the same rationale that should be applied to allowing tax exemptions for jeopardizing
investments to help charities, because it is preferable to allow such exemptions with penalties for
imprudent investing rather than to not allow the exemptions at all. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at
31 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1675. The Senate bill cautions against
exemptions for investments such as warrants, futures, options, and margin purchases. See S. REP.
No. 91-552, 45 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2073; see also Bishop, supra note
18, at 255-56.
139. See I.R.C. § 4944 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (1972).
140. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (2011).
141. Compare Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (traditional statute using "industry," original PRI




in legislative drafting, 4 2 as we discuss in Part II, the proposed govern-
ance framework for L3Cs offers a workable solution.
A second important distinction between the original PRI language
and the transliterated L3C statutes has to do with the context of the lan-
guage. The original PRI language was written from the perspective of
the foundation. It specifically mandated that the foundation's program-
related investment significantly further the accomplishment of one or
more of the foundation's charitable or educational purposes, that the
foundation's PRI would not have been made but for the relationship of
the PRI to the accomplishment of the foundation's charitable or educa-
tional purposes, and that no significant purpose of the foundation's PRI
is the production of income or the appreciation of property. The assump-
tion in adopting the PRI language for use in L3Cs is that when a founda-
tion's charitable or educational aims are in sync with an invested
company's aims, the invested company's aims could be inferred to be
charitable or educational as well. Furthermore, the original PRI concept
that an investment would not have been made but for the investment's
relationship to the accomplishment of the foundation's charitable or edu-
cational purpose is not necessarily equivalent to the L3C transliterated
language that the company would not have been formed but for the com-
pany's relationship to the accomplishment of the company's charitable
or educational purposes. When considering context, and understanding
that foundations are not relieved from either an upfront fact-intensive
analysis to determine whether a PRI can be made or expenditure respon-
sibility to monitor the investment, the transliteration is less of an easy
qualification for L3Cs to meet than what some L3C proponents may
suggest. Nonetheless, the transliterated language may stand on its own
as an aspiration and assurance of an L3C being able to prioritize a chari-
table purpose and accommodate a financial purpose, though with a
caveat that such state L3C statutes may neither expedite nor simplify an
appropriate federal tax analysis.
c. L3C Integration of PRI Language for Charitable Purpose
L3Cs must further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or
142. Daniel S. Kleinberger & J. William Callison, When the Law is Understood-L3C No 4
(William Mitchell C. L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-07, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568373 ("how is it possible to have a low profit limited
liability company when no significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the
appreciation of property?"). But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020, supra note 136
(necessarily defeats the unattainability argument); see also generally John Tyler, Negating the
Legal Problem of Having "Two Masters": A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and
Accountability, 35 VT. L. REv. 117, 131 (2010).
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educational purposes under section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Code.' 4 3 Much
like managers who have a duty of loyalty to their LLC and directors who
have a duty of loyalty to their 501(c)(3) organization," L3C managers
arguably have a duty of loyalty to the L3C and its charitable purpose.
Though L3C statutes make no direct reference to personal benefit or
non-distribution, 4 5 the L3C manager's undivided and unselfish duty of
loyalty to the enterprise necessarily subordinates one's personal interests
and generally precludes misconduct associated with self-dealing, con-
flicts of interest, fraud, usurpation of corporate opportunity, lack of dis-
closure, misappropriation, and other situations where a manager may use
a position of trust or confidence to further private interests.' 46
The addition of provision (A)(ii) in the Vermont L3C statute is not
only a "but for" legal phrase of art in parroting the original PRI lan-
guage,147 but it is also an assurance of charitable primacy; that is, that
the reason for the L3C's existence is for the accomplishment of its chari-
table purpose. Taken together, (i) and (ii) convey a mandate for an L3C
manager to prioritize the organization's charitable purpose above all
other things and to consider such priority as a framework for fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care.' 48
d. L3C Integration of PRI Language for Financial Purpose
Though it is clear that L3Cs must pursue a charitable purpose, what
is less clear is whether L3C statutes permit or restrict profit-seeking.
According to the Vermont L3C statute, on which most of the current
L3C statutes are based, L3Cs must ensure that "no significant purpose of
143. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2010) ("organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision
of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals"). Cf
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (relating to exempt purposes of 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations).
144. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors'
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 409, 428 (2002) (directors of charitable, exempt organizations have fiduciary duty
to organization's charitable purpose (citing Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of Not-For-Profit
Health Care Providers: A Proposalfor Federal Guidelines on Mandated Charitable Foundations,
10 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 247, 250 (1999))).
145. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) ("no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual").
146. Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors' Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 675, 683 (2009).
147. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (1972) ("An investment shall be considered as made
primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) if it
significantly furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and if the
investment would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and the
accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities.").
148. See generally Tyler, supra note 142.
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the company is the production of income or the appreciation of prop-
erty."l 4 9 Some commentators15 0 have warned that the inclusion of such
language is poor drafting in that it restricts profit-seeking by any L3C
investor but is contrary to the premise of funding flexibility of an L3C,
which is to use tranching and various kinds of activities, both profit-
seeking and non-profit-seeking, that a normal LLC may undertake.'
The Vermont PRI language 52 offers some relevant guidance on
what "no significant purpose" means. In the context of foundations mak-
ing PRIs to a certain charitable activity and profit-seeking private inves-
tors also investing in that same activity, one relevant factor would be
whether the investor would likely make the investment on the same
terms as the foundation.'5 3 If the foundation's investment intercedes
where the marketplace would not, then the foundation's jeopardy invest-
ment would likely not qualify as having a "significant purpose" being
income or capital appreciation.154 Even if such an investment generated
significant income or capital appreciation, that alone would not be deter-
minative of significant purpose.15 5
In the L3C context, if an L3C enters into a charitable line of busi-
ness, it must consider whether such an opportunity is one where a com-
petitor demanding market rates of return would easily enter. By this
logic, if an L3C is focused on providing job-assistance programs for
low-income residents who have been underserved by the marketplace,
then it is likely that, on these facts alone, no significant purpose of the
L3C would be for income or appreciation of property.' 5 6 If this same
149. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 3001 (2011).
150. See Kleinberger & Callison, supra note 142. at 4.
151. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 908-09.
152. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii) (1972). ("In determining whether a significant purpose
of an investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property, it shall be relevant
whether investors solely engaged in the investment for profit would be likely to make the
investment on the same terms as the private foundation. However, the fact that an investment
produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, be
conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or the
appreciation of property.").
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., id. § 53.4944-3(b) at ex. (6). A below-market loan to a business enterprise
owned by a nonprofit community development corporation that markets agricultural products of
low-income farmers in a depressed rural area will qualify as a program-related investment. See
also, e.g., id. at ex. (1) (stating that a below-market loan to a business owned by an "economically
disadvantaged minority group" located in a "deteriorated urban area" will be a program-related
loan when conventional lenders are unwilling or unable to provide financing.).
155. See id. § 53.49443-(a)(2)(iii).
156. Cf § 53.4944-3(b) at ex. (4) ("X is a business enterprise which is not owned by low-
income persons or minority group members, but the continued operation of X is important to the
economic well-being of a deteriorated urban area because X employs a substantial number of low-
income persons from such area. Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide
funds to X at reasonable interest rates. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X at an interest
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L3C becomes aware of a government stimulus program recently imple-
mented to help underserved communities and can now generate more
income, it is still likely that the L3C has no significant purpose for
income or appreciation of property because the L3C would not have
been formed "but for" the underserved need. If the L3C is formed
because it became informed of this stimulus program, and it wanted to
use the L3C form to undercut traditional for-profit competitors that now
want to serve the same marketplace, then the facts are less in favor of
the L3C's significant purpose of not profiteering. Like the analysis that
foundations regularly engage in when making PRIs, the analysis for "no
significant purpose" is an intensively fact-based exercise fraught with
potential legal hazards.
Under PRI regulations, when circumstances change, like the above
L3C learning about and being able to benefit from a recent stimulus
program, an investment does not automatically cease to qualify as a PRI,
but a closer examination may be required."' For example, if the L3C
were formed pre factum, its ability to profit may still qualify as "no
significant purpose"; however, should significant time go by where such
a stimulus program, by its perceived interminable existence, becomes a
de facto regularly budgeted welfare service, or should the L3C prove to
be an unabashed financial success, then the ability for the L3C to exist
with no significant purpose as profitability becomes compromised. At
that point, L3Cs, as a matter of to-be-determined policy, may be
encouraged to convert to LLCs or another legal form (some L3C operat-
ing agreements foreseeably have such provisions), to divest some of
their "significant purpose" activities, or, if policy makers allow and
social entrepreneurs agree, to continue on such that L3Cs are not an
arguably temporary and provisional legal form, but are a permanent fix-
ture in the fourth-sector firmament.
The assumption of L3Cs as "low-profit" is understandable in its
namesake designation as low-profit limited liability company, though
some social entrepreneurs may consider this to be a misnomer.' The
rate below the market rate for commercial loans of comparable risk. The loan is made pursuant to
a program run by Y to assist low-income persons by providing increased economic opportunities
and to prevent community deterioration. No significant purpose of the loan involves the
production of income or the appreciation of property. The investment significantly furthers the
accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship
between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related
investment.").
157. See id. § 53.4944-3(a)(3)(i) (explaining that even if there is a "critical change in
circumstances" whereby the investment "ceases to be program-related," this alone will not subject
it to the tax imposed by § 4944(a)(1), as there are requirements that "the foundation (or any of its
managers) has actual knowledge of such critical change in circumstances").
158. See Tyler, supra note 142, at 124 n.32.
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term was originally used to signal an expectation of low returns to the
public and investors. 59 As evidenced above, however, "low-profit" also
is similar to "below-market" situations, which are important factors in
foundation PRI decisions. Though profit-seeking behavior on the part of
L3Cs is collateral to charitable purpose, the weight that financial pur-
pose has in an L3C, especially in the minds of its managers, is less
ascertainable and fact-dependent.
e. Other Criticisms of the L3C
Returning to concerns of oversimplifying PRI qualification, Profes-
sor Daniel Kleinberger is correct that foundations must conduct a fact-
intensive analysis of whether to make a PRI and must exercise expendi-
ture responsibility to monitor their investment.160 His conclusion that
organizing as an L3C "does nothing to facilitate the analysis,"' 6' how-
ever, may be predicated on an assumption that an investment in an LLC
with PRI language infused into its articles, organization, or operating
agreement is the same as an investment in an L3C with PRI language
infused into its governing L3C statute. Under LLC law, the contract or
operating agreement is kingl 62 (the articles are usually a single page of
state-required elements of registered agency and declared lawful pur-
pose), with the statute as the gap-filler.163 An L3C statute, on the other
hand, imposes inviolate principles of adherence to PRI's charitable pur-
pose primacy for which abandonment results in an "immediate" cessa-
tion of the company as an L3C, though the company can continue to
exist as an LLC.'" Here, the L3C statute is not a mere gap-filler, and
this cessation provision cannot be circumvented by modification of the
159. Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and
Mission Driven Organizations, 36 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 251, 4 (2007).
160. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 890-91; Tyler, supra note 142, at 120 n.8. See also
Treas. Reg. § 53-49441(a)(2)(i) (1973) (when determining whether an investment has
"jeopardize[d] the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a foundation," it is necessary to consider
whether "the foundation managers . . . have failed to exercise ordinary business care and
prudence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment").
161. Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 899.
162. See R.U.L.L.C.A. § 102 (2006). The operating agreement is the essential contract that
governs the affairs of a limited liability company.
163. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED Bus. ENTITIEs 826 (4th
ed. 2009).
164. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, ch. 21, §§ 3001(27), 3005(a), 3023(a) (2010). The Vermont L3C
statute, like all other L3C statutes, states that, "If a company that met the definition of this
subdivision [PRI requirements of charitable purpose, no significant purpose is income or asset
appreciation, no electioneering or lobbying] at its formation at any time ceases to satisfy any one
of the requirements, it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but by
continuing to meet all the other requirements of this chapter, will continue to exist as a limited
liability company." The mechanism and enforcement of a forced conversion from an L3C
immediately to a LLC is unclear and potentially problematic.
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L3C articles, organization, or operating agreement. Though the L3C is
an LLC variant, it differs in this subtle but crucial way: an L3C may not
abandon its devotion to PRI without sacrificing its very existence as a
legal entity. The tax risk to a foundation is consequently reduced if pre-
scient drafting of the foundation-L3C agreement includes a stop-loss
provision or other reinvestment options upon an L3C cessation.165
The inclusion of mandatory and mirrored PRI language in L3C stat-
utes that requires charitable primacy and subordinates income generation
is also likely to reinforce clear branding and public trust in L3Cs, as well
as set investor expectations on social and financial returns. 166 L3Cs may
also support tranched investments as described in Part II.A., though fur-
ther analysis of this mechanism requires a detailed tax analysis outside
of the scope of this article.16 1
The dual charitable and financial purposes of L3Cs invite an appar-
ent conflict of fiduciary duties.'"" In general, hybrid legal forms with
multiple bottom lines may, at first glance, seem to be innately beset with
conflicting priorities for various stakeholders. Leaders in these organiza-
tions may be unclear about how to prioritize and decide among compet-
ing mission and economic interests and about what their duties and
resulting liabilities are to various stakeholders. Investors may not be sure
about how to measure returns that are a mix of quantitative financial
results and qualitative social outputs. Creditors may not comprehend to
what standards of behavior they can hold a mixed-motive organization
or even what their recourse is in collecting on assets potentially dangled
or locked into the charitable stream. Policymakers and politicians are
likely inspired by the public appeal of capitalistic vehicles that promote
charitable purposes with a likely reduced burden to government social
services, but they understand that for all good intentions, the devil is in
the details.
These are some of the questions that arise when we are asked to
examine organizational forms, which must function at the convergence
165. As a personal observation, L3Cs are arguably more akin to nonprofit LLCs than for-profit
LLCs, which is a further area of exploration that this article will not address. Many LLC statutes
now no longer require or assume LLCs to be for-profit. R.U.L.L.C.A. § 104(b) (2006) ("A limited
liability company may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit."). The risk of
improper L3C-to-LLC conversions may also be addressed through the operating agreement, where
veto power may be given to each member or to someone who is not a member. See, e.g., REviSED
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 112(a) (2006) ("An operating agreement may specify that its
amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a party to the operating agreement or the
satisfaction of a condition. An amendment is ineffective if its adoption does not include the
required approval or satisfy the specified condition.").
166. See Bromberger, supra note 27, at 9-10.
167. For an in-depth analysis of tranching and its benefits, see generally Brewer & Rhim,
supra note 17.
168. See also Tyler, supra note 142, at 118.
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of the government, business, and nonprofit sectors. Each of the above
parties' expectations and accountabilities require a more thorough analy-
sis, but the central character of interest here is the social entrepreneur
who leads the organization. An understanding of his or her fiduciary
duties and suggested decision-making approach will be crucial in deter-
mining whether L3Cs will be able to mature and take flight or whether
such promising innovations will be relegated to further incubation.
Professor Kleinberger, a vocal critic of the L3C form, cautions that
the proposed simplicity of the L3C brand belies the regulatory complex-
ity and risk of investing in an entity which is not yet tested in the courts
and not yet recognized by the IRS. 6 ' Particular concern may be that the
mirrored inclusion of PRI language in L3C statutes, articles of organiza-
tion, and operating agreements, as well as in private placement memos,
side letters, and purchase agreements, 17 0 may lull all parties into assum-
ing L3Cs automatically qualify for PRIs when, as contended, making
PRIs in L3Cs is currently no different than making PRIs in LLCs."'
II. GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN L3Cs
A. Fiduciary Duties in For-Profit Entities
Directors of for-profit corporations owe "duties of care and loyalty
to the corporation and its shareholders."' 72 Under Delaware law, which
often cues the market for corporate law, the directors' conduct is mea-
sured against a gross negligence standard in duty of care cases.17 3 Duty
169. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 879 ("The L3C is not on track (let alone a fast track) to
any special status under the Code"); see also Bishop, supra note 18, at 266 ("At this writing, no
federal tax authority has been forthcoming to bless the L3C-PRI concept broadly. Therefore, the
PRI determination must continue to be made on a case-by-case basis.").
170. Chernoff, supra note 18, at 3, 4.
171. Marcus Owens & Sharon Nokes, RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED IN NASCO's LETTER
DATED MARCH 19, 2009, 3 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://americansforcommunity
development.org/downloads/NASCO.pdf (claiming that "most, if not virtually all, L3Cs will be
structured to qualify as recipients of PRIs, with both taxable and tax-exempt ownership
interests.").
172. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (Under well-
established Delaware law, "directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation
and its shareholders." (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
179 (Del. 1986); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939))).
173. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) ("The
second category of conduct ... involves lack of due care-that is, fiduciary action taken solely
by reason of gross negligence and without any malevolent intent."); see also STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 125-26 (2d ed. 2009) (stating that "several jurisdictions adopt
ordinary negligence as the relevant standard in duty of care cases" but that Delaware, where the
majority of the large U.S. companies are incorporated, and various other states opt for a gross
negligence standard. Bainbridge also notes the paucity of cases "imposing liability on directors for
negligence in the absence of a concurrent breach of the duty of loyalty or other conflict of
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of care claims against directors may include claims for oversight in man-
aging the affairs of the corporation.17 4 Under the companion and more
potent duty of loyalty, directors are "not permitted to use their position
of trust and confidence to further their private interests" and must also
act in good faith.175 Commentators disagree on whether directors of for-
profit corporations should focus on the "corporation" or the "sharehold-
ers" in carrying out their fiduciary duties. 7 6 As a practical matter, how-
ever, the business judgment rule and exculpatory provisions enabled by
statutory provisions-like Delaware General Corporation Law
§ 102(b)(7)-protect the vast majority of directorial decisions, as long
as those decisions can be rationally described as potentially benefiting
the corporation and ultimately increasing shareholder wealth.17 7 Manag-
ers of limited liability companies owe similar fiduciary duties to their
members, unless those duties are altered, within the bounds of the law,
interest.") (citations omitted); see generally I R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKLESTEIN, THE
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.15, at 4-100 (3d ed. Supp.
2010).
174. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 173, at 130-31; see generally In re Caremark Int'l, Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
175. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750-51 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) ("[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act
in good faith."); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
("Essentially, the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders") (citation omitted); see also Holland, supra note
146, at 676 ("loyalty is now the central theme in the Delaware judiciary's stories or opinions about
the fiduciary duties of directors."); see generally BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 173; 1
STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 787-94 (6th ed. 2009).
176. Compare Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1993) (arguing that directors'
abilities to make decisions in favor of "constituencies cannot readily be justified in terms of long-
term shareholder gain.") with Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1446-47 (1993)
(arguing that "the basic rule that shareholder interests come first has governed public
corporations" and should continue to do so.) (footnotes omitted).
177. Most directorial decisions are protected by the business judgment rule and often also by
exculpatory charter provisions enabled by statutory provisions like Delaware General Corporate
Law section 102(b)(7). Under the business judgment rule, "[d]irectors are entitled to a
presumption that they were faithful to their fiduciary duties." Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004) (citations omitted); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 95 (2004)
("[T]he whole point of the business judgment rule is to prevent courts from even asking the
question: did the board breach its duty of care?"). Delaware General Corporation Law section
102(b)(7) authorizes corporations to include provisions in their certificates of incorporation that
protect "directors from personal monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care." In re
NYMEX S'holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 30, 2009).
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in the company's operating agreement.1 78
Academics debate whether the law guides directors to pursue share-
holder wealth maximization (primarily or exclusively), or, more gener-
ally, advises directors to seek the health and welfare of the corporation
as a whole. 179 Traditionally, the law has tasked directors of for-profit
companies primarily with maximizing shareholder wealth.' The busi-
ness judgment rule and various constituency statutes, however, provide
directors with wide latitude in how they go about attempting to achieve
this end." Directors of for-profit companies are generally free to cause
their corporation to engage in charitable actions, or actions that benefit
178. See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay P.K.I., C.A. No. 3658-VCS,
2009 WL 1124451, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) ("in the absence of a contrary provision in the
LLC agreement, the manager of an LLC owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to
the members of the LLC.") (citation and footnotes omitted); see generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 165-78 (2010).
179. Compare Bainbridge, supra note 176, at 1423 ("Shareholder wealth maximization long
has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers") and KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIEs 41-42 (2006) (arguing that "[tjhere is no principle of corporate law that is more
central to the way businesses are organized and regulated within the United States" than that of
shareholder wealth maximization) with Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v.
Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 1, 5 (2008) ("shareholder wealth maximization is
not a modem legal principle") and Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability,
and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1007 (2009) ("In sum,
corporate law contains no general requirement that directors and officers maximize shareholder
profits and only departs from this view in rare instances that should not affect most green business
decisions." (citing Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989))).
180. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 NW. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes."); see also Bainbridge, supra note 176, at 1423; Fairfax, supra note 144, at 430-34
(noting that there was a traditional notion that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder
wealth, and discussing the ongoing debate regarding how much focus directors should place on
shareholder wealth maximization).
181. See supra note 177. Constituent statutes generally authorize directors "to consider the
effect of their actions on nonshareholder groups such as employees, creditors, bondholders,
suppliers, and communities." JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 4.05 (2d.
ed. 2003). Over one-half of states have enacted some type of constituent statute. Id. Accord
Virginia Harper Ho, "Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 75 (2010); see also Tyler, supra note 142, at
131 (stating that thirty-one states have constituency statutes of some variant); see also Green,
supra note 176, at 1411-12 (constituency statutes generally "permit directors, while acting in the
best interests of the corporation, to take into account a variety of constituencies other than
shareholders, including employees, communities, customers, and suppliers. Because these statutes,
with few exceptions, specify that the impact on other constituencies must have a relationship to
the best interests of the corporation, understood in terms of shareholder gain, they represent little
more than codifications of the business judgment rule as it has recently been interpreted by the
Delaware courts.) (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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non-shareholder stakeholders such as the community or employees.'82 In
the for-profit context, courts are often careful to point out that actions
taken on behalf of non-shareholder constituencies in the short term could
lead to shareholder profits in the long term.' With a long-term outlook,
almost any action on behalf of non-shareholder constituency could lead
to an increase in shareholder wealth.' Charitable donations or raising
employee pay, for example, could increase goodwill, and at some later
point in time, increase profits.' In fact, for-profit corporations increas-
ingly are marketing their philanthropic actions to the public.'8 6
As discussed above and due to business judgment rule protection,
directors of for-profit corporations, as a practical matter, are unlikely to
face liability for taking actions that favor non-shareholder constituents,
so long as those actions involve no conflicts of interest.' When a sale
182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §122(9) (West 2011), which explicitly states that for-
profit corporations have the power to "[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof');
see also A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (rejecting shareholders'
challenge to a corporate donation made to a local university); accord Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405-06 (Del. Ch. 1969); Fairfax, supra note 144, at 414 ("[TJhe
current status of the for-profit director's duties reveals that the social entity model of the
corporation governs most of a director's decision-making. This means that corporate law allows
directors of post-conversion companies to take actions that advance the interests of their
beneficiaries, even when those actions fail to generate the maximum level of shareholder profit.").
183. A. P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 590 (stating that a corporate donation to Princeton University
"was made to a preeminent institution of higher learning, was modest in amount and well within
the limitations imposed by the statutory enactments, and was voluntarily made in the reasonable
belief that it would aid the public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private
corporation and as part of the community in which it operates.) (emphasis added); Theodora
Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405 (noting the "relatively small loss of immediate income otherwise
payable to plaintiff and the corporate defendant's other stockholders, had it not been for the gift in
question . . . [and the benefit to the] plaintiff in the long run.").
184. See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1385, 1425 (2008) (noting "the board's substantial de facto discretion to deviate from
shareholder wealth maximization in the day-to-day business of the corporation under the business
judgment rule, so long as some plausible long-term benefit to the shareholders can be
articulated.").
185. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 835-36 (stating that "corporate donations do have considerable efficiency and tax
advantages. The efficiency advantage is that even profit-sacrificing corporate donations will have
some goodwill effect that reduces the net outlay.").
186. See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1259 (2011) (discussing
the marketing of their philanthropic actions by Starbucks and Whole Foods, among other for-
profit companies); Barbara Stark, Theories of Poverty/The Poverty of Theory, 2009 BYU L. REV.
381, 429 n.248 (2009) (stating that cause marketing "has been criticized by some activists who
claim that the primary beneficiaries are businesses... . [For example,] Red companies collectively
spent as much as $100 million in advertising and raised only $18 million") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
187. See supra note 177; see also Page & Katz, supra note 62, at 232 (stating that "[a]lthough
it is fair to claim that there is a norm, and possibly even a legal requirement, of shareholder wealth
maximization (i.e. that directors must make decisions in order to maximize corporate
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of a company is inevitable, however, the law increases its scrutiny of
directorial actions and courts more strongly steer directors of for-profit
corporations towards shareholder wealth maximization.18 1 In the cases
involving Ben & Jerry's and craigslist, discussed above, the founders of
the companies at issue appeared dedicated to the social mission of their
respective companies but were waylaid in their efforts to preserve strict
adherence to the mission by the threat of, or actual force of, for-profit
corporate law.189
B. Fiduciary Duties in Nonprofit Entities
Similar to their for-profit counterparts, directors of nonprofit boards
owe duties of loyalty and care in carrying out their responsibilities.'10
Unlike for-profit companies, however, the primary focus of the non-
profit form is not wealth creation but rather charitable purpose.' 9' In
some jurisdictions this requisite focus on charitable purposes is embod-
ied in the "duty of obedience."1 92 The duty of obedience does not have a
counterpart in the law governing for-profit organizations and has been
said to be "key to holding directors legally accountable to their organiza-
tion's charitable purpose and to donors' legitimate expectations."l 93
There is some debate over whether the duty of obedience "actually
exists as a separate duty, or whether it is best described as an element of
profitability), commentators on both the right and left recognize that shareholder wealth
maximization is effectively unenforceable by courts.") (citations omitted); Shlensky v. Wrigley,
237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (the court famously deferred to the directors of the
Chicago Cubs in their decision to not install lights in the baseball stadium. The court stated that "it
appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be considered by a
director who was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games if the park
were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run interest of the corporation in its property
value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating. By
these thoughts we do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a
correct one. That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are merely saying that the decision is
one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision.").
188. Sneirson, supra note 179, at 1007. ("In Revlon situations, since there will be little left of
the company following its sale, it is perfectly sensible and consistent with the principles described
earlier in this Section to require boards to focus exclusively on shareholders.") (citation omitted).
189. See supra, Part I.B.2.
190. See, e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 632 (1998)
("Nonprofit directors and officers generally operate under the same legal standards under state law
in terms of managerial obligations and the duties of loyalty and care as their for-profit peers.").
191. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1992)
(in the nonprofit world, the "non-distribution constraint prevents the organization from
distributing its net earnings to those in control of the corporation").
192. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84-90 (1988).
193. Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors' Duty of Obedience, 30
CARDozo L. REV. 1677, 1679-80 (2009).
38 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care as applied to [nonprofit] organi-
zations." 94 The duty of obedience is a rather "nebulous" duty to carry
out the mission of the organization and has been described as "essen-
tially prohibit[ing] directors from 'deviat[ing] in any substantial way
from their duty to fulfill the particular purpose for which the organiza-
tion was created,' unless, the particular deviation is permitted by
law."l 95
Fiduciary duty law tasks directors of nonprofits with furthering the
charitable purpose of the organization. Fiduciary duty law does not,
however, focus on holding nonprofit directors directly accountable to
donors.196 Generally, the law provides that the fiduciary duties owed to
nonprofits may only be enforced by directors and officers of that organi-
zation, members (if any exist), the state Attorney General, and persons
with a special interest.'9 7 Most nonprofits do not have members, and
directors and officers are often hesitant to bring suit against one another,
which leaves only the state Attorney General responsible.' 98 The state
Attorney General's office is already stretched thin and does not have the
same vested interest in ensuring the proper management of an organiza-
tion as do shareholders or members in a for-profit company.199 As a
194. Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Nonprofit Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW.
1, 20 (2000).
195. Id. (quoting JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 228
(1995); see also In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 186 Misc.2d 126, 152 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999) ("It is axiomatic that the board of directors is charged with the duty to ensure that
the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has been referred to as the 'duty
of obedience.' It requires the director of a not-for-profit corporation to 'be faithful to the purposes
and goals of the organization,' since '[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate objective is
to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives: perpetuation of
particular activities are central to the raison d'dtre of the organization.'") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
196. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 465 (1996) ("[I]n most
nonprofits there is no clear category of principals. Under law, the nonprofit firm is not the agent of
a particular donor or client or beneficiary. As a result, most state nonprofit laws, perhaps without
intending to, create agents without principals.").
197. See KURTZ, supra note 192, at 92-93.
198. Benjamin, supra note 193, at 1697-98 (stating that "[i]f the trustees breach their duties,
any individual's allegation of injury is too abstract to convey standing. The state Attorney General
('AG'), as the representative of the public interest, has standing to sue in such cases.") (citations
omitted); see also KURTZ, supra note 192, at 93-96.
199. Benjamin, supra note 193, at 1698-99; James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 262 (2003) ("Staffing problems and a relative lack of interest
in monitoring nonprofits make attorney general oversight more theoretical than deterrent.");
Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1406 (1998) ("We
might expect close regulation of charities, but this is not the case. The state attorney general
enjoys nearly exclusive authority and discretion to challenge a charity manager's actions. Such a
structure puts pressure, as the Delaware Attorney General once complained, on 'the inclination
and budget of a public official to vindicate [the beneficiaries'] rights.'") (citation omitted).
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result of the limited standing, there is a dearth of fiduciary duty cases in
the nonprofit arena. 20 The proffered reasons for not expanding standing
include: (1) preventing the destruction of many nonprofits which are
already on tight budgets and could not withstand the increase in law-
suits; (2) avoiding second guessing of directorial decisions by those
unfamiliar with the given nonprofit or by those promoting a personal
agenda; and (3) deterring individuals, many of whom currently volunteer
their services, from serving on nonprofit boards.201 While there may be
valid reasons for not increasing standing in nonprofit fiduciary duty
cases, there is "wide agreement that the current scheme does not provide
effective oversight" of nonprofit director or manager conduct.202
C. Proposed Fiduciary Duty Framework for L3Cs
"[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity hold-
ers, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable
to neither."20 L3Cs, as hybrid entities, were created to serve, at least to
some extent, both the profit master and the charitable master. A number
of early commentators have noted this "two masters problem," which
plagues social enterprise or hybrid organizations.204 This section submits
that charitable purpose must be the primary focus of L3Cs, notes the
implications if L3C managers stray from the charitable purpose focus,
200. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the
Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETmics 1, 37 (2005) ("The
efficacy of fiduciary principles [in the nonprofit context] is further hampered by the scarcity of
precedents. Only a handful of cases address the duties of care and loyalty; mention of the duty of
obedience is even rarer. This is in part due to state law limiting standing to challenge breaches of
the fiduciary duties to attorneys general, members, and directors."); see generally Fishman, supra
note 199, at 256-61.
201. Benjamin, supra note 193, at 1698.
202. Id. (citing Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 640 (1998); Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 608 (1981); Kenneth
L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 433, 437 (1960); Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice to
Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 143-45 (2007));
see also Fishman, supra note 199, at 262-63.
203. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMic STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). See also Tyler, supra note 142, at 138, 141-43.
204. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 142, at 117-18 (noting the "arguably conflicting, dual
purposes" of L3Cs and other hybrid business forms such as B-Corporations, and the need for
"predictability and consistency"); Linda 0. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C &
Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 7 (2010) ("The governance
structure of a social enterprise is complicated regardless whether new or existing forms are used.
At its simplest level, the fundamental question of social enterprise governance is how does
management balance the company's profit-making endeavors with furthering company social
objectives when the two conflict or when furthering one may impede progress toward the other?
The biblical admonition against serving two masters could have been written with social
enterprises in mind.").
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and proposes an enforcement scheme that resembles that of for-profit
companies, with fiduciary duties enforced primarily by the owners of the
entity.
1. PROPER ORDERING: CHARITABLE PURPOSE AT THE HELM
Managers and directors can serve only one ultimate master, but that
does not mean L3Cs are doomed to fail or be redundant of other busi-
ness forms. 205 The PRI requirements built into the L3C statute mandate
that the L3C's ultimate master be "charitable purpose." 2 06 The L3C's
primary master is, and must be, markedly different than the primary
master of corporations, shareholder wealth maximization. 207 Just as the
law allows corporations to engage in a wide range of charitable activity,
however, L3Cs should be allowed to engage in profit-making activity. 208
L3C managers should merely make their decisions regarding the organi-
zation with their primary focus on "charitable purpose." In for-profit
entities, certain actions, such as giving employees a raise or making a
charitable donation, may lessen profitability in the short term, but argua-
bly will lead to greater profits in the long term.2 09 Similarly, L3Cs
should be allowed to pursue profit on the rationale that doing so will
ensure the viability of their company and allow them to better raise capi-
tal in the future. This profitability should not be pursued for the ultimate
sake of profit by the managers of the L3Cs, but for the ultimate sake of
the longevity and vitality of the "charitable purpose." When the profit
master and the charitable purpose master irreconcilably conflict in the
operation of an L3C, however, the charitable purpose master must rule.
2. IMPLICATIONS OF LOSING A CHARITABLE PURPOSE Focus
If managers of L3Cs take their eyes off of the charitable purpose
goal, the IRS will be more likely to disallow PRI investments because
the IRS intends PRI investments to be focused on a charitable purpose.
The IRS has yet to rule on whether it will assume L3Cs to be appropriate
vehicles for PRIs, but the IRS would likely look less favorably on L3Cs
if L3Cs are seen either as entities focused on profits or even entities with
an equal focus on profits and charitable purpose. 210 To survive, L3Cs
205. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 203.
206. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Tyler, supra note 142, at 143 ("There is but one master in
the L3C-charitable, exempt purposes.").
207. See supra Part Hl.A.
208. Id. (discussing the various charitable activities in which for-profit corporations may, and
do, engage).
209. Id.
210. Minnigh, supra note 15, at 209 ("Because the IRS has not explicitly ruled on whether
L3Cs qualify as [recipients of] PRIs, a private foundation's investment in the L'C could be
considered a jeopardy investment under § 4944 and a 10% excise tax would be imposed on both
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must be seen as focusing on charitable purpose, and not as entities that
use cheap foundation funding to cater to their "market-rate" investor
needs. The proper ordering, with charitable purpose at the helm, must be
clear and legally enforceable.2 1 1
D. Enforcement of L3C Fiduciary Duties
As discussed above, "charitable purpose" must be the L3C's pri-
mary objective.2 12 As such, the substance of the fiduciary duties
imposed on managers of L3Cs should most closely resemble those of a
nonprofit. The enforcement of those duties, however, should, in our
opinion, resemble the for-profit model. The state Attorney General's
office is overworked, underfunded, and under incentivized to keep non-
profits accountable.2 13 Similarly, with L3Cs, the state Attorney Gen-
eral's office will likely have neither fully adequate resources nor the
driving personal motivation of an owner to curb fiduciary duty viola-
tions.2 14 On the other hand, members of the L3Cs will be much more
likely to have both the resources and strong personal motivation to better
prevent managerial abuse.2 15
As discussed in Part III, however, members with a primary profit
motive should be discouraged from investing in L3Cs in the first
place. 2 16 Investors who are profit-focused could initiate expensive litiga-
tion that would drain L3Cs dry when the L3C does not pursue profit as
aggressively as the profit-focused investor prefers. While the law should
direct L3C managers to primarily pursue charitable purpose and allow
members to sue to enforce the managers' fiduciary duties, the law
should also provide business judgment rule protection to L3C managers
for the same reasons that protection is afforded to directors of for-profit
corporations .217
the private foundations and its managers. Moreover, under § 4942 if the investment were intended
as a qualifying distribution then there could also be an excise tax of 30% on the amount
distributed to the L 3C.").
211. Tyler, supra note 142, at 143 ("There is but one master in the L3C-charitable, exempt
purposes.").
212. See supra Part II.C.1.
213. See supra note 187; see Tyler, supra note 142, at 154, 156-57.
214. See supra Part 1I.B.
215. Cf Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (stating, in the nonprofit context, that "[t]he donor of a charitable gift is in a better position
than the Attorney General to be vigilant and, if he or she is so inclined, to enforce his or her own
intent.").
216. See infra Part III.
217. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, "Latchkey Corporations": Fiduciary Duties in Wholly
Owned, Financially Troubled Subsidiaries, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming Sept. 2011) ("Courts
employ the business judgment rule because: (1) it encourages board service; (2) it encourages risk
taking; (3) courts recognize that directors are generally better situated to make business decisions
412011]
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III. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE CAPITAL PUZZLES AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Hesitance of Traditional Investors and the Model Investor
for the L3C
Traditional early-stage investors,218 such as your average venture
capitalist, are currently confused by the L3C form.2 19 When traditional
investors learn that "charitable purpose" is king for the L3C, most are
likely to run in the other direction.220 Even more socially-conscious
investors, who embrace the "doing well by doing good" mantra, may
hesitate to invest if they recognize that the managers have a clear fiduci-
ary ordering, and where profit is merely a possible byproduct, rather
than the ultimate objective. 2 2 1 L3Cs may in fact "do well by doing
good," but again, the ultimate purpose must be "doing good."222
The model investor for an L3C would have priorities that match the
priorities engrained in the L3C form. Thus, the model L3C investor must
than judges; (4) courts recognize the statutory regime provides responsibility for managing the
corporation to directors, not shareholders; and (5) courts recognize that unhappy shareholders can
always vote the directors out of office.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). This rationale
also largely applies to L3Cs and suggests that courts should give broad business-judgment rule
protection to L3C managers.
218. In this article, the phrase "traditional investors" refers, generally, to investors who focus
primarily on profit and have at least millions, if not billions, of dollars in capital at their disposal.
219. Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont's Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions
to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REv. 163, 177 (2010) ("the L3C business form has actually confused some
[of the companies'] funders and customers.").
220. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 17, at 354 ("[V]enture capitalist and institutional investors
such as pension funds . . . do not line up neatly with the needs of hybrid social enterprises. Those
investors typically expect market rates of return, which hybrid, multiple-bottom-line organizations
are rarely in a position to offer." (citing Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and the
Promise of For-Profit Philanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 95 (2007))); see also Dana
Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 111
(2010) (expressing doubt that an L3C will be able to attract market-rate investors if it "allocates
complete or dominant control to foundations or socially-responsible investors."); Bishop, supra
note 18, at 243 ("Capital formation is particularly difficult. To attract capital from the business
world, the L3C must offer market risks and returns, a difficult task for a hybrid social entity.");
see also Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 908-09 (arguing that market-rate investors will not be
comfortable with the contradiction between the L3C's statutory language which says that "no
significant purpose of the company is the production of income" and statements by L3C
proponents that tranched investing in an L3C will yield a "particularly favorable equity
investment.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). We agree with Professor Kleinberger
that the "no significant purpose of the [L3C] is the production of income" language is troubling
and should be revisited. 1
221. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 359 ("[A]lthough some SRI [Socially Responsible
Investment] funds may be willing to accept marginally lower financial returns in exchange for a
demonstrated social benefit, many will not." (citing Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in
Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment,
57 Bus. LAW. 681, 689 (2002))).
222. See supra Part I.C.1.
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be primarily interested in the "return" produced by being involved in a
charitably focused venture. Some have called this "return" a "warm
glow." 223 Secondarily, and permissibly, in certain cases, investors in an
L3C may expect a profit, but this expectation of profit may lead to secur-
ity law complications described in the following section.224
B. The Securities Law Minefield
The definition of "security" under U.S. securities laws is extremely
broad.225 The Securities Act of 1933's definition of "security" includes
any "investment contract." 22 6 In the seminal case of S.E.C. v. W. J.
Howey Co., the U.S. Supreme Court stated that an "investment con-
tract," in the context of the securities laws, means "a contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or a third party."2 27 Over fifty years later, in S.E.C. v. Edwards,2 28
the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a transaction that promises fixed
returns also falls within the definition of "investment contract," along-
side a transaction that promises variable returns. 229 Typically, "the
'investment contract' analysis applies to determine whether a member-
ship interest in an LLC [and presumably also membership in an L3C] is
223. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 186, at 2 ("Economists call 'warm glow' the utility one
derives from giving.").
224. Professor Kleinberger correctly notes that profit-making cannot be a significant purpose
of the L3C, but this limitation does not prevent L3Cs from making money nor does it totally bar
investors from being allowed to expect some return. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 908-09;
see also Tyler, supra note 142, at 124 n.32.
225. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1982) ("The definition of
'security' in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is quite broad. . . . [T]he term 'security' was
meant to include 'the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.'") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
226. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The law states that "[tihe term 'security' means any note,
stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." (emphasis
added).
227. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
228. 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
229. Id. at 394. ("There is no reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns and
promises of variable returns for purposes of the test [for "investment contract" as defined by the
securities law], so understood. In both cases, the investing public is attracted by representations of
investment income").
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a security."230 The analysis is "complex, but essentially turns on whether
a person is investing in a common enterprise with the expectation of
profits to be made chiefly through the efforts of others."231
The combination of federal and state securities laws in the United
States are notoriously difficult to navigate.232 The securities laws are
traps for the unwary and can add significant costs to the capital-raising
process. Due to the significant costs involved in registering a securities
offering, much effort is often expended attempting to find a way to fall
within one of the accepted exceptions to the registration requirements.233
The federal securities laws provide certain exceptions to the registration
requirements for securities offered to "accredited investors." 234 For the
purposes of federal securities law, "accredited investors" includes, inter
alia: (1) persons with a net worth (with or without spouse) of over $1
million at the time of purchase; (2) persons with an income in excess of
$200,000 (or in excess of $300,000 with a spouse) in each of the two
most recent years and "a reasonable expectation of reaching the same
income level in the current year;" (3) a corporation, partnership or chari-
table organization with assets in excess of $5 million; (4) a trust with
assets in excess of $5 million, charitable organization, "not formed for
the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase
is directed by a sophisticated person;" and (5) "any director, executive
officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or
sold."2 35
Raising capital primarily from "accredited investors" would help
L3Cs find shelter in an exception to the onerous federal securities regis-
tration requirements, but "accredited investors" may be wary of commit-
ting substantial sums of capital to an L3C for fear of having limited
230. See Kleinberger supra note 18, at 902 (citing CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (2006)).
231. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 902.
232. See, e.g., Stefania A. Di Trolio, Note, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny
Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 1279, 1299 (2004) (noting that some
commentators have argued that state securities laws "are too complex-they are a 'crazy-quilt of
state regulations no longer significant or meaningful in purpose, and usually stultifying in effect,
or just plain useless."' (quoting J. Sinclair Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713,
714-15 (1958)).
233. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC: Are There Legal Ways to Offer and Sell Securities
Without Registering with the SEC?, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#eod6
(last updated Nov. 14, 2009).
234. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2010) (noting that accredited investors are exempted
from the calculation of the number of purchasers for the purposes of complying with the limits
imposed by Rules 505 and 506. Rules 505 and 506 provide exceptions to the federal securities
laws registration requirements). Accord Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1169-70 (E.D.
Cal. 2008). This article does not attempt to delve into the complexity of the various state securities
laws.
235. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
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ability to push a profit-making agenda. Investors, both accredited and
non-accredited, may be willing to commit smaller amounts of money to
an L3C that focuses on a charitable purpose that the investor feels pas-
sionately about.2 36 If the investors feel strongly enough about the cause
championed by the L3C, investors may even be willing to commit small
amounts of capital with absolutely no expectation of any return on their
investment, but merely an expectation of the return of their capital. 23 7 If
the L3C is clear that no profit should be expected, the L3C may be able
to steer clear of the onerous federal securities registration requirements,
because imbedded in the definition of a security is the concept that an
investor "expects profits" from the investment in the security.2 3 8 With-
out the expectation of profit, it may be difficult to convince a few indi-
viduals to each contribute a large sum of capital. As discussed below,
however, it may be much easier to raise the same significant sum needed
by using crowd-sourcing and convincing a large number of people to
each contribute a small amount of money.239 With only a small amount
of money committed per investor, each individual investor may be satis-
fied with the expectation of only the return of their capital and a dollop
of "warm glow."
C. Calling the Crowd: Crowd-Funding for L3Cs
Unlike traditional early stage capital-raising, which generally relies
on a few individuals to each provide a substantial investment, crowd-
funding (a/k/a crowd-sourcing of financing) generally relies on many
individuals to each provide a relatively small investment.24 0 Crowd-
funding also typically targets individuals who have some personal con-
nection to the purpose for which money is being raised.2 41 Due to the
relatively small investment and relatively strong connection to the pur-
pose, crowd-funding participants are more likely to accept a low or no
236. See infra Part III.C.
237. Id.
238. S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
239. See infra Part III.C.
240. Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers Should
Know About the Legal Pitfalls, ENT. & SPORTs LAW., Summer 2010, at 15. ("Crowd funding is the
use of fans as financiers. Sums-generally in small increments-are collected from a wide
breadth of people who generally have little to no prior experience in financing entertainment
ventures. Crowd funding often implicates the use of Intemet-based social media tools to raise
awareness of opportunities for fans to contribute funds for a project. While mammoth sites such as
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and MySpace can be utilized for this purpose, several specialty sites
have gained notoriety as the leaders in the crowd-funding arena, including Kickstarter (http://
www.kickstarter.com) and IndieGoGo (http://www.indiegogo.com)." The crowd-funding referred
to in this article refers to use of large number of investors outside of the public markets, and
generally at a time well in advance of an initial public offering.
241. Id.
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return on their money and may also be more eager to support the charita-
ble mission of the L3C than traditional investors.2 42
Two obvious questions arise: (1) Could crowd-sourcing provide
enough money to support a decent-sized social enterprise? and (2)
Would people really contribute with no expectation of a return? While
the following examples provide merely anecdotal evidence, they do
show the substantial capital-raising potential of the crowd, even when
the crowd is not promised a return.243
1. GREEN BAY PACKERS
While crowd-funding has become more popular in recent years and
more practical with the advent of the Internet, crowd-funding is not a
new concept. In 1923, 1,000 fans of the Green Bay Packers bought
shares in the football team for $5 each. 2 4 The thirteen-time world-
champion Green Bay Packers continue to raise money through fans and
continue to have an unconventional ownership structure today.245 The
National Football League football team is owned by fans in the form of
a nonprofit corporation.24 6 The fans are not paid dividends, the stock
does not appreciate, and the stock may not be resold to anyone except
the franchise itself.24 7 If the team is ever sold, "all proceeds must go to a
foundation for distribution to local charities."2 48 The Green Bay Packers
have sold shares three times since 1923, and the most recent capital raise
in 1997 brought in $24 million for the redevelopment of Lambeau Field,
the team's home stadium. 249 Despite the fact that the shares have little-
to-no income-producing value, "owners" have called the shares their
"favorite security" and said that the shares have "great intangible
242. Satorius & Pollard, supra note 240, at 16 ("Perhaps the biggest advantage is that if the
[crowd-funding] arrangement is properly structured, the funds raised are untethered-there is no
obligation for the producer to repay backers.").
243. Though it is outside the scope of this article to analyze whether these examples would be
more conducive to using a hybrid legal form or whether enhanced benefits in fundraising or
operations might be conferred from such use, the examples arguably support that entities such as
nonprofit corporations and perhaps L3Cs could be substantially sustained on crowd-funding,
which we discuss in Part flI.D as a preferred alternative to tranched investing and an important
funding component for L3Cs.
244. Eben Novy-Williams, Packers $200 Share That Can't Rise or Trade is Banker's Favorite
Security, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/
packers-200-share-that-can-t-rise-or-trade-is-banker-s-favorite-security.html.
245. See generally History-Super Bowls & Championships, PACKERS.COM, http://www.
packers.com/history/super-bowls-and-championships.html (last updated Mar. 2, 2011); Patrick
Hruby, The Right Way? The Green Bay Way, ESPN.com (Jan. 31, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.
comlespn/commentary/news/story?page=hruby/l 1013).
246. Hruby, supra note 245.
247. Id.; see also Novy-Williams, supra note 244.
248. Hruby, supra note 245.




2. BLUE LiKE JAZZ
Blue Like Jazz was a New York Times best-selling book by author
Donald Miller.2 5 ' The book sold well over one million copies, and, as
described in the book's subtitle, is made up of a collection of "nonreli-
gious thoughts on Christian spirituality."25 2 A few years after the book
was published, the author and others decided to make a film loosely
based on the book.253 After raising a portion of the funds needed to
shoot the film, money from traditional sources dried up.254 The poor
economy hurt the fundraising efforts, and the content of the proposed
film made it a difficult sell to traditional investors. Some traditional
investors did not want to invest in a film with a faith-based message,
while others did not want to invest in a film that would include secular
scenes leading to a PG-13 rating. 25 5 The author of Blue Like Jazz
thought the film would not be made due to lack of funding, and he said
so publicly on his blog.256 Fans of the book wanted the movie made and
set up a website on Kickstarter.com to raise money.257 In less than a
month, the fans raised $345,992 with 4495 donors participating.2 5 8 Only
nine donors donated over $3000, and the average donor contributed only
$76.97.259 While demographic statistics are unknown, it is likely (judg-
ing from the comments on the Kickstarter website) that the donors were
younger and much less wealthy than the traditional investor.2 60 The
online contributors to the film Blue Like Jazz had no expectation of
profit, no expectation of getting any of their money returned, and no
250. Id.
251. Paperback Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/
books/bestseller/1029bestpapemonfiction.html.
252. DONALD MILLER, BLUE LIKE JAZZ: NONRELIGIOUS THOUGHTS ON CHRISTIAN
SPIRITUALITY (2003).
253. Professor Murray's father, V. T. "Chip" Murray, Jr. and Chip Murray's firm, The Panda
Fund, were involved in financing the film Blue Like Jazz.
254. Donald Miller, Blue Like Jazz the Movie, the Update, DONALD MILLER's BLOG (Sept. 16,
2010), http://donmilleris.com/2010/09/16/blue-like-jazz-the-movie-the-update/.
255. Id. The author, Donald Miller, explained the difficulty of raising money from traditional
investors in Christian films by stating on his blog that "there is language, drug use and a scene
where the protagonists put a giant condom on a steeple. To me, it's the only movie that takes an
honest look at a Christian kid coming of age in America, a story experienced by tens of millions of
students each year. But students don'tfund Christian movies, older white guys do, and they find it
hard to relate to the theme." (emphasis added).
256. Id.
257. SAVE Blue Like Jazz! (The Movie), KiCKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/
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expectation of a tax deduction.2 6 ' The individual contributions were not
large, but collectively, they accounted for a significant sum. Through
Kickstarter, the Blue Like Jazz team reached non-traditional investors-
passionate fans of the book-and raised a sizeable amount of money
when the traditional investors were largely unavailable.
3. KIVA
As mentioned in Part I, users of nonprofit Kiva have pumped over
$200 million into developing countries by way of small or micro-loans
made by the over 573,000 users of the site. 26 2 The minimum "invest-
ment" is only $25 and the lenders do not expect any interest but merely
the return of their investment.263 Kiva loans boast a repayment rate of
over 98% and the website has become a model for other similar
websites.264
IV. THE POWER AND POTENTIAL OF CROWD-FUNDING FOR L3Cs
The above three examples, while obviously handpicked for their
relative success, at least show the immense potential of crowd-funding
for projects close to the heart of investors. In all three examples, the
investors expected no return on their money, thus avoiding the onerous
federal securities registration requirements discussed above.265 Crowd-
funding may allow an L3C to: (1) access a large number of investors; (2)
allow each of the many investors to contribute a relatively small amount,
which may increase the likelihood that the investor will forego the
expectation of profit; (3) reach investors who support the charitable mis-
sion of the L3C; and (4) avoid onerous federal security law registration
requirements if crowd-funders forgo the expectation of profit.
Of course crowd-funding from individuals who do not expect a
profit would not be the only way that L3Cs could raise capital. If it were,
one could rightly argue that the business should be formed as a nonprofit
entity. The L3C can also receive funding from foundations, and even
traditional investors. Using crowd-funding to finance a substantial por-
tion of the needs of an L3C, however, lessens the need for traditional
261. The donors were only given small gifts, based on their level of contribution, such as a call
from the producer of the film, memorabilia and/or listing as an "associate producer" in the credits
of the film. Id.
262. Kiva-About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited May 6, 2011). Professor
Murray received $25 in Kiva dollars from a friend, Megan Howard, in 2009 and was thereby able
to experience, first hand, the "warm glow" associated with providing no-interest loans to those in
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investors who may guide L3Cs away from their charitable mission in
search of profit.266 In addition, traditional investors, while able to invest
in L3Cs, should be made well aware of the primary purpose of L3Cs.
Likewise, venture capitalists should advise their clients of the primary
purpose of L3Cs before investing, or even set up a separate fund for
social-based investing and let their clients know that L3Cs that have a
charitable mission as their primary purpose will be included in the
portfolio.
A. Avoiding Wealth Transfer: Locking Profits into the
"Social Stream" 2 67
Critics of L3Cs have focused on the potential for wealth transfer
from tax-advantaged foundations to profit-seeking investors.268 These
critics rightly note that profit-seeking investors in L3Cs may piggyback
off of the cheap capital provided to L3Cs by foundations and other
social-minded investors. 269 To address this fair criticism, we suggest that
crowd-funders take the place of traditional investors who are unwilling
to accept the primacy of charitable purpose in the L3C. We also suggest
that profits associated with the capital provided by tax-advantaged foun-
dations or stemming from the capital provided by charity-focused
crowd-funders be locked into the "social stream." Rather than using the
cheap capital of the foundations and crowd-funders to inflate the returns
of the profit-seeking investors, we suggest mandating that L3Cs either
return to the foundations and crowd-funders their pro-rata share of prof-
its (above their initial investments) or retain those profits in the L3C to
further the L3C's charitable purpose.270
To further clarify our proposal, let us look at a simple example. A
foundation, crowd-funders, and social investors help an L3C raise
266. See Kleinberger, supra note 18, at 899-900 (discussing the problems that may arise when
"the interests of the foundation and those of the 'top tranch' investors substantially diverge.").
267. As defined above, the phrase "social stream," as used in this article refers to the capital
floating in the third (charitable) and fourth (social enterprise) economic sectors.
268. Kleinberger & Callison, supra note 142, at 3 (arguing that L3Cs may simply transfer
wealth from foundations to private investors.); Bishop, supra note 18, at 265 ("The tranche-
investment notion potentially violates the private-inurement restriction. As such, it raises the
specter of impropriety regarding whether the foundation is allowing its assets to be used to inure
private benefit to the commercial or market tranche in the L3C.").
269. See generally id. "Socially-minded investors" include the crowd-funders discussed in Part
III.C.
270. Currently, L3C legislation allows L3Cs to convert to LLCs with relative ease. While the
exact mechanism is beyond the scope of this article, we believe that statutory safeguards should be
put in place to assure that the profits created on the back of foundations and crowd-funders is not
hijacked by traditional investors. A mechanism to keep the pro-rata share of profits earned on
foundation/crowd-funder capital should be kept in the "social stream," and foundations often do
ensure certain contractual provisions to protect from improper conversions.
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$150,000 in capital. Each group contributes $50,000. If the L3C turns a
profit of $180,000, then $60,000 would be returned to the social inves-
tors, who would typically be "accredited" investors within the meaning
of the securities laws. The crowd-funders receive their $50,000 invest-
ment back (if they so choose) and the remaining $10,000 of their share
would be retained by the L3C. We suggest that the profits associated
with the crowd-funders' contributions, above the initial investment
amount, be retained by the L3C in an attempt to avoid costly security
registration requirements that would be incurred if a large number of
unaccredited investors expected a profit.2 7 ' Finally, the $60,000 earned
by the foundation could be returned to the foundation, or all or a portion
of the funds could be retained by the L3C, depending on the particular
arrangement between the L3C and the foundation.
Our suggestion differs from the tranched approach championed by
Robert Lang and others.272 Lang suggests that traditional investors could
achieve market-rate returns by hitchhiking on the low-cost capital pro-
vided by foundations.273 As a simple example, if a foundation and a
traditional investor both invest an equal amount of capital, and the mar-
ket rate of return is 10%, the traditional investor could make a market
rate of 10%, even if the L3C only made a 5% profit, if the foundation
agreed to take no return on its money. We believe, however, that both
socially minded investors and the IRS will not look favorably on this
type of arrangement. Socially minded investors, including crowd-
funders, who are passionate about the social purpose of the L3C, will be
less likely to invest if it becomes evident that their funds are simply
going to provide market-rate profits for traditional investors. Founda-
tions may also face wealth transfer issues if they go into an arrangement
knowing that a likely or expected result is that their investment return
will be essentially assigned to market-rate investors. With the founda-
tions receiving their pro-rata share of the profits and the crowd-funders'
share of the profits being retained by the L3Cs, traditional investors will
receive less of a return than under a tranched system, if everything else
remains equal. This fact means that only traditional investors with a seri-
271. See supra Part III.B.
272. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The LC, History, Basic Construct, and
Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) ("For those for whom the term is not familiar,
tranching refers to layering. Normally each tranche represents a class of members and each class
has a different level of risk and receives different returns on their investment in addition to other
rights and privileges of the class. ... Because the whole entity will operate in the low-profit zone,
and it does not have to pay any tranche of investor a high return, the result can be a market rate of
return for market-rate investors who are investing in the enterprise alongside the foundation [who
accepts little or no return on its investment].") This arrangement is one but not the only tranching
arrangement available under L3Cs. Id.
273. Id. at 17.
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ous commitment to the charitable mission of the L3C will invest. We
submit that this is as it should be and will decrease the power of the pull
between purpose and profit. 274
Currently, L3Cs may be converted into profit-focused LLCs.275
L3Cs may also be purchased by profit-focused entities. If those events
occur, what happens to the capital of the socially minded investors? We
believe that the capital attributable to socially minded investors should
be retained in the social stream. Upon conversion to or purchase by a
profit-focused entity, the law should require the L3C to cash out the
socially minded investors. For the crowd-funders, who contributed
mainly due to the charitable purpose of the L3C and who, due to security
law restrictions, cannot expect a return; their share of the L3C should be
paid to a foundation, nonprofit, or L3C with a similar charitable purpose.
With these requirements, social investors who contribute to an L3C can
be better assured that their contribution will be used to further the chari-
table purpose and not to line the pockets of profit-focused investors.
B. Benefits of the L3C
If you remove investors who are primarily motivated by profit from
the L3C picture, what benefits does an L3C form offer beyond what is
already available in the nonprofit form? First, the L3C form offers a
possibility of profit to accredited investors, a possibility of enhanced
returns or preserved capital to foundations, and a possibility of the return
of their investment to the crowd-funders. Second, the L3C form offers a
new, fresh brand. This brand strives towards pulling the best from both
for-profit and nonprofit entities. And third, the L3C is more flexible than
a 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity and can be easier to form than a
501(c)(3).2 76
CONCLUSION
In addition to reviewing the literature and arguments surrounding
L3Cs, our article offered four concrete suggestions on how to make the
274. This is not to say that our proposal will eliminate all leakage from the "social stream." It
will not. We hope, however, that the proposal will help assure the IRS, foundations and crowd-
funders that the vast majority of their money is going to address the charitable purpose of the L3C
and not merely going to line the pockets of the market-rate investors.
275. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, § 3001(D) (2010) ("If [an L3C] ... ceases to satisfy any one
of the [statutory] requirements, it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability
company, but ... will continue to exist as a limited liability company.").
276. Obviously, the operating agreements of L3Cs can also be as complex as the parties
involved desire within the bounds of the law. What we mean by "easier to form" is that an L3C
can be very simple to create, while a 501 (c)(3) requires the observation of numerous formalities to
create.
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L3C more workable for its socially conscious managers, investors, and
the public.
First, from a governance perspective, and in resolving the L3C's
seemingly conflicting priorities of charity and profit, we recognized that
L3C managers are bound by charitable primacy, yet argue that managers
should be given latitude vis-A-vis the business judgment rule to pursue
profit-making that may ultimately serve the L3C's charitable purpose.
Second, from an enforcement perspective, we recommended that
L3C members should be given standing to sue L3C managers for devia-
tions from charitable primacy. Again, however, the business judgment
rule, should, in our opinion, provide L3C managers with significant pro-
tection. We agreed with other commentators who suggest Form 990
information self-reporting as a practical way to ensure an L3C's com-
mitment to its charitable purpose.
Third, in addressing the capital-raising issues surrounding L3Cs,
we submitted that most traditional investors will be unlikely to invest in
an entity that prioritizes purpose above profit. To fill the gap, we sug-
gested that L3Cs rely on crowd-funding capital in addition to capital
from foundations, nonprofits, and other socially-conscious investors.
Through crowd-funding, L3Cs may: (1) access a large number of inves-
tors; (2) allow each of the many investors to contribute a relatively small
amount; (3) reach investors who support the charitable mission of the
L3C, and (4) avoid onerous federal security law registration require-
ments by reaching investors who will acknowledge that they are not
investing with an expectation of profit but rather only for a return of
their capital.
Fourth, we argued that the capital committed by social investors to
L3Cs should be locked into the "social stream." By this we meant that
social investors, such as foundations, nonprofits, and socially conscious
crowd-funders, should either receive their pro-rata share of L3C profits
or those profits should be retained by the L3C. Moreover, we suggest
that if an L3C converts to a profit-focused LLC or if the L3C is pur-
chased by profit-focused entity, the law should mandate either the return
of social investors' interest in the L3C or require that the value of that
interest be paid to an entity with a similar, required charitable focus.
By implementing these and other suggestions, we believe the L3C
could be a promising entity form for social entrepreneurs in the twenty-
first century and beyond.
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